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iABSTRACT
Despite the use of strong encryption schemes, one can still learn information about
encrypted data using side channel attacks [2]. Watching what physical memory
is being accessed can be such a side channel. One can hide this information by
using oblivious simulation – hiding the true access pattern of a program. In this
paper we will review the model behind oblivious simulation, attempt to formalize
the problem and define a security game. We will review the major solutions pro-
posed so far, the square root and hierarchical solutions, as well as propose a new
variation on the square root solution. Additionally, we will show a new formaliza-
tion for providing software protection by using an encryption scheme and oblivious
simulation.
ii
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, there has been a need to hide the content of messages. Early uses
include the Caesar cipher, a simple substitution cipher where each letter is replaced
by another, to hide military orders. As knowledge of cryptography increased, the
methods used to hide messages have become increasingly complex. Today, we use
many mathematical concepts to hide the content of messages. Sometimes hiding
the content of messages is not sufficient however. If an attacker is able to gather
enough information outside of the message content, this may lead them to learn
information hidden in the message itself. For example, if the attacker notices
that every time the target accesses a specific file on the Internet, they send a
shipment of parts the next day, the attacker is able to learn information about
the target that should potentially be kept secret. In this case, simply hiding the
message content does not provide enough security and such side channel attacks
are possible. To provide complete security, the target also needs to hide what files
they are accessing.
Chen et. al. showed that such side channel attacks have become a viable threat
with today’s infrastructure [2]. Most people have become used to using Internet
services to get health information or file their taxes. Such server transactions
are typically encrypted using HTTPS. Despite using encryption, these researchers
were able to show that detail information about the user could still be learned,
such as the illness of a person and the medications they are taking or their family
2income. They were able to learn this information simply by watching the amount
of data being sent back and forth between the client and the server. For example,
in an online health application, when the user selected a health condition from a
list, the browser would send the user’s selection back to the server. The server in
turn would send back an updated web page with information on that illness. By
learning the size of the page for each health condition, they could determine which
conditions a user had without seeing any unencrypted data. Such vulnerabilities
were found on several major websites, telling us that simply watching what we
access, encrypted or not, can leak key information that we do not want public.
Hiding what file the target wants to access is referred to as oblivious simulation,
a mechanism for hiding the real accesses of the target. Imagine a program that does
not try to hide what locations are being accessed. The list of locations the program
goes to is referred to as an access pattern. To provide oblivious simulation, the
program changes the access pattern to hide which locations it really cares about.
This is typically done by accessing many locations in addition to the one location
the program really wants.
There are many applications where oblivious simulation is advantageous. In
recent years, cloud computing has become increasingly popular. More frequently,
companies are using cloud data services to store large amounts of data. The trust
relationship with the outside world becomes a key consideration when storing and
accessing data on the cloud. Simply encrypting the data might not provide enough
security; if an outside party watches which sections of data are accessed and which
actions follow, they may be able to discern information. Oblivious simulation can
provide an added layer of security here, allowing companies to take advantage of
the many services offered by the cloud.
Cloud computing is not the only application for oblivious simulation; it also
can be used in designing hardware components. Increasingly secure hardware com-
ponents are being used in various computing applications. For example, physically
3secure CPUs may be used to perform sensitive actions that cannot be done on a
regular desktop computer. Typically more than a CPU is required for most ap-
plications though. All of the needed components would need to be included in
the secure hardware unit without oblivious simulation. With oblivious simulation
and an encryption scheme, the CPU could use untrusted memory on a desktop
computer to store information while it works.
Currently, there are two main solutions to the oblivious simulation problem: the
square root solution and the hierarchical solution [3, 8]. Both solutions have some
basic parts in common, but diverge from each other in key ways. The square root
solution is based on the use of permutations. As the program runs, the memory is
permuted at regular intervals to keep the attacker from knowing what really exists
at each location. The hierarchical solution and its variations are based on a series
of hash tables. As the program runs, the information is moved between the various
tables, again preventing the attacker from knowing what really exists in each hash
table.
Both solutions to the problem of oblivious simulation are in the relatively early
years of their development. In this paper, we will build the background necessary
for understanding both solutions, then analyze each solution in depth. We will
provide formal proofs that both methods provide oblivious simulation, as well as a
new variation on the square root solution. Additionally, we will discuss variations
on the hierarchical solution already proposed.
1.1 Our Contributions
We will expand upon the existing proofs for both the square root solution and
the hierarchical solution, adding more formality and depth. For the square root
solution, we will also propose a new variation that significantly decreases the time
overhead of simulation. Finally, we will give a formal security reduction show-
ing that software protection can be given using a semantically secure encryption
4scheme and oblivious simulation.
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PRELIMINARIES
We will be using several constructs from cryptography in this paper, ranging from
types of security to random oracles. Before discussing the oblivious simulation
problem, one must have an understanding of these topics. Additionally, we will
review the Batcher sorting network as it is used heavily in this paper.
2.1 Encryption Scheme
An encryption scheme is a three-tuple of algorithms Π = (K, E ,D). K is the
key generation algorithm, which as its name suggests, is used to create keys for
using with the system. The key generation algorithm is randomized and we denote
K
$←K for running the key generation algorithm which returns a key K. The set
of all keys is denoted by Keys(Π). E is the encryption algorithm, which takes
a specific key K ∈ Keys(Π), along with a plaintext message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
produces a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. To denote running E with key K and
message M , we write C $←EK(M). The ciphertext hides the original message so
it is safe to send on an unsecured line. The final piece is the decryption algorithm
D, which like the encryption algorithm, takes a key K ∈ Keys(Π) and a ciphertext
C ∈ {0, 1}∗. When the ciphertext is received, the decryption algorithm is applied
to the key and the ciphertext. If decryption is successful, the original plaintext
message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is returned, otherwise if decryption fails ⊥ is returned. We
denote running this algorithm as M ← DK(C). In this paper we will be using
symmetric encryption schemes, where both the sender and the receiver have the
6same key which is used for both encryption and decryption.
2.2 Adversaries
An adversary is a theoretical entity that represents all of the various threats against
an encryption scheme. Typically, this means learning any information about the
messages being sent between the sender and receiver. The adversary can be re-
stricted in certain ways or given certain abilities, depending on the type of security
being tested. For example, the adversary may be computationally bounded and
only allowed to run for so long. Or the adversary may be allowed to tamper with
the messages being sent between the sender and receiver, instead of just watching
the messages. The adversary may be allowed to adapt its behavior as the attack
continues instead of sticking to a set plan of attack.
2.3 Oracles
In security proofs, adversaries and encryption schemes are commonly given access
to an oracle. An oracle provides black-box access to some algorithm or function.
The users of the oracle do not know what is done inside the oracle, but can query
it and receive results from its computations. Oracle accesses are considered to take
a single unit of time in most models of computation.
2.3.1 Random Oracles
The random oracle is an important theoretical construct in cryptography, used to
generate random data. When the random oracle is queried with an input that it
has not seen before, the output is selected uniformly at random from all possible
outputs the oracle may return. If it sees that same input a second time, it will
return the same output as before instead of choosing a new output. The random
oracle can be used whenever one needs to generate truly random bits as part of a
7security proof.
2.4 Indistinguishability Under Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
In the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack security game (IND-CPA),
the adversary is given access to a left-right encryption oracle (see Figure 2.2). The
adversary is allowed to query the encryption oracle as many times as it wants, send-
ing two messages, M0 and M1. If both messages are the same length, the oracle
will encrypt one of the messages and return the ciphertext to the adversary. If
the adversary is in World 0, M0 will be encrypted; otherwise if the adversary is in
World 1 then M1 will be encrypted each time. This game is testing whether or not
the adversary can learn any information about the plaintext given a ciphertext. If
the adversary cannot do much better than guessing which world it is in, the en-
cryption scheme informally is said to be indistinguishable under a chosen-plaintext
attack.
Oracle EK(LR(M0,M1, b)):
if |M0| 6= |M1| then return ⊥
C
$←EK(Mb)
return C
Figure 2.1: The IND-CPA Left-Right Encryption Oracle
More formally, the indistinguishability game for an encryption scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) works as shown in Figure 2.2. The left-right function, denoted by
LR(M0,M1, b), returns ⊥ if M0 and M1 are not the same length. Otherwise if
the bit b is 0, it returns EK(M0) and EK(M1) if b is 1. A bit b is chosen uni-
formly at random, as is a key K according to K. Both are given to the oracle
EK(LR(M0,M1, b)) (see Figure 2.1). The oracle operates as follows when queries
with (M0,M1): if both messages are not of the same length, the oracle returns
⊥, otherwise the oracle returns EK(Mb). If the adversary is in World 0, it is
8given access to the oracle EK(LR(M0,M1, 0)); if it is in World 1, it gets access to
EK(LR(M0,M1, 1)). The adversary may query the oracle as many times as it likes
before guessing which world it is in. If it correctly guesses the world, it wins the
game.
b
A
World 0
Ek(LR(M0,M1, 0))
Ek(M0) or ⊥
(M0,M1)
World 1
Ek(LR(M0,M1, 1))
Ek(M1) or ⊥
(M0,M1)
Figure 2.2: The IND-CPA Security Game
If we are in World 0, the instance of the IND-CPA game with adversary A
and encryption scheme Π is called the World 0 experiment or Expind-cpa-0Π (A) (see
Figure 2.3). In World 1, it is referred to as Expind-cpa-1Π (A) (see Figure 2.4).
Experiment Expind-cpa-0Π (A):
K
$←K
b
$←AEK(LR(·,·,0))
return b
Figure 2.3: The IND-CPA Experiment in World 0
Experiment Expind-cpa-1Π (A):
K
$←K
b
$←AEK(LR(·,·,1))
return b
Figure 2.4: The IND-CPA Experiment in World 1
The advantage of the adversary (a measure of how well it does) is defined as
the probability that it actually guesses it is in World 1 when it is in World 1 minus
9the probability that it guesses it is in World 1 when it is really in World 0:
Advind-cpaΠ (A) = Pr
(
Expind-cpa-1Π (A) = 1
)
− Pr
(
Expind-cpa-0Π (A) = 1
)
(2.1)
If the advantage is close to zero, that means the adversary is wrong about half the
time about which world it is in, which is not much better than randomly guessing
the world. However, if the advantage is close to one, that means it is almost always
right about which world it is in and is a good adversary. For an encryption scheme
to be considered IND-CPA secure, it should have a small advantage.
2.5 The Batcher Sort
A Batcher sorting network [1, 6] is a type of merge sort. Unlike a sorting algorithm,
the steps taken by a sorting network are only determined by the length of the
input. The Batcher sorting network begins by splitting the input into two parts
recursively until only two values need to be compared, sorting those elements and
then performing even-odd merges until the entire list is sorted. A program would
perform the sort using the following procedures:
Procedure Sort(low, high, list):
If high− low ≥ 1
mid = low + high−low2
Sort(low , mid, list)
Sort(mid + 1, high, list)
Merge(low, high, 1, list)
Procedure Merge(low, high, step, list):
newStep = 2 ∗ step
If newStep < high− low
Merge(low, high, newStep, list)
Merge(low + step, high, newStep, list)
For i = {low + step, low + step + newStep, low + step + 2 ∗ newStep, . . . ,
high− step}:
Order(i, i + step, list)
Else
Order(i, i + step, list)
10
Procedure Order(x, y, list):
If list[x] > list[y]
tmp = list[y]
list[y] = list[x]
list[x] = tmp
Else
list[x] = list[x]
list[y] = list[y]
As you can see from the pseudocode, the only time the value is considered is
when Order is called, but the same addresses are accessed regardless of the values.
Since the comparisons do not depend on the values, the same steps are done each
time the algorithm is called on lists of the same length.1
Now that we have constructed the basic cryptographic principles, we can begin
to develop the necessary notions for the oblivious RAM problem and its associated
concepts.
1For the correctness of the algorithm, refer to [1].
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Chapter 3
THE OBLIVIOUS RAM PROBLEM
Before analyzing the various solutions for the oblivious RAM problem, it is im-
portant to have a firm grasp of exactly what the problem entails. We will begin
this chapter by defining the RAM model and how it operates. Ostrovsky takes the
standard RAM model and redefines it to be two interconnected Turing machines
[8]. Once that is understood, oblivious simulation (also called the oblivious RAM
problem) will be defined as well as its associated security games.
3.1 The RAM Model
A random access machine (RAM) is the combination of two Turing machines.
Specifically, we will be using interactive Turing machines (ITM). An ITM is a
five-tape Turing machine, as depicted in Figure 3.1: a read-only input tape, a
write-only output tape, a read/write work tape, a read-only communication tape
and a write-only communication tape. ITMs are parametrized by the length of
the work tape and the block size of the communication tape. We denote this
as ITM(c,w) where c is the block size of the communication tape and w is the
length of the work tape. To start the ITM on some input x, which we denote
by ITM(c,w)(x), the input is written to the read-only input tape of the ITM. The
ITM copies the input to the first |x| positions on its work tape (or halts if the
input is longer than the work tape) and then works in rounds. The round begins
by reading the next block from the read-only communication tape. The ITM does
any computations needed on the work tape, then writes a block to the write-only
12
communication tape. When the ITM has finished execution, it copies the final
results to the output tape. Execution can be halted by one of two ways; either
a special symbol telling the ITM to halt was read off of the work tape or the
computations performed by the ITM signaled that it should halt.
ITM
RO Input Tape
RW Work Tape
RO Communication Tape
WO Communication Tape
WO Output Tape
Figure 3.1: The ITM Model
The RAM combines two ITMs, one referred to as the CPU and the other as
MEM. The CPU has a limited amount of storage, similar to the registers on a real
CPU. The MEM on the other hand is like the memory in a computer; compared
to the amount storage on the CPU there is quite a bit. In the RAM, the read-only
communication tape of the CPU is connected to the write-only communication
tape of the RAM and vice versa (Figure 3.2).
Let us begin by defining how the MEM ITM works. We denote MEMk for
ITM(k,2kk), k ∈ N, with the work tape divided into 2k words of length k. The first
word on the work tape is associated with an address of one, the second word is
addressed with two and so on for all 2k words. When MEMk is started on some
input x, denoted by MEMk(x), the input is copied to its work tape like an ITM
normally does. From then on the MEM is message driven. Messages are of the
form (a, i, v), where a ∈ {0, 1}k is an address on the work tape, i is an instruction
and v ∈ {0, 1}k is a value. Three different instructions can be sent to the MEM:
13
CPU MEM
RO Input Tape RO Input Tape
RW Work Tape RW Work Tape
RO Communication Tape WO Communication Tape
WO Communication Tape RO Communication Tape
WO Output Tape WO Output Tape
Figure 3.2: The RAM Model
read, write and halt. If the read instruction is sent, the value sent is ignored and
the MEM writes the value currently stored at address a on its work tape to the
communication tape. Otherwise, if the write instruction is sent, the value v sent by
the CPU is written to word a on the MEM’s work tape and to the communication
tape. The final instruction is halt. When the MEM receives this instruction it
copies its work tape to its output tape until a special symbol is hit.
The CPU ITM is where all of the work is done in the RAM model. Here we
denote CPUk for ITM(k,k), k ∈ N. When the CPUk is started on some input x,
again denoted by CPUk(x), the input is copied from the input tape to the work
tape. The CPU performs some calculations based on this input and then sends a
message of the same form that the MEM receives: (a, i, v), where a ∈ {0, 1}k is an
address, i ∈ {read, write, halt} is an instruction and v ∈ {0, 1}k is a value. Like
the MEM, the CPU is driven only by messages from this point on. After sending
a message, with the exception of sending the halt instruction, the CPU waits to
receive a message back which will be a value v ∈ {0, 1}k. The message is copied to
the work tape and the CPU performs another set of calculations and sends another
14
message. When the CPU sends the halt message, it halts itself with no output.
Formally, we define a family of types RAMk = (CPUk,MEMk), for k ∈ N,
where CPUk = ITM(k,k) and MEMk = ITM(k,2kk). When operating an instance
of RAMk, it is started on some input (s, y) where s is the input for CPUk and
y is the input to the MEMk. The CPUk and MEMk alternate rounds with the
CPUk running first until the CPUk halts. The output from RAMk is the output
of MEMk(y) when interacting with CPUk(s).
CPU MEM
RO Input Tape RO Input Tape
RW Work Tape RW Work Tape
RO Communication Tape WO Communication Tape
WO Communication Tape RO Communication Tape
WO Output Tape
WO Output TapeWO Oracle Tape
RO Oracle Tape
Figure 3.3: The Oracle-RAM Model
A simple variation of the RAMmodel is the oracle-RAM (Figure 3.3). Here, the
CPU is given access to two extra tapes which are used to access a random oracle: a
read-only oracle tape and a write-only oracle tape. When the CPU writes a query
to the write-only oracle tape, the CPU is moved into a special oracle invocation
state. In a single step the oracle writes the output corresponding to the input
15
queried to the read-only oracle tape. This model is commonly used to simulate a
RAM that is given access to an encryption scheme.
3.2 Oblivious RAMs
Some RAMs may have the property of being oblivious ; if an adversary is watching
the messages between the CPU and the MEM, it cannot tell what memory the CPU
is really trying to access. This is formalized using the concept of access patterns.
An access pattern for a deterministic RAMk, k ∈ N, on input (s, y) is the list of
memory locations accessed by the CPU, denoted by Ak(s, y) = (a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . .)
where the ith message from the CPUk to the MEMk is (·, ai, ·). For an oracle-
RAMk on input (s, y) we use the random variable A˜k(s, y) to represent the access
pattern. A˜k(s, y) assumes a specific value for RAMk given a uniformly selected
random oracle on input (s, y). We will use the function RO to refer to this instance
of the oracle. An oracle-RAMk is said to be oblivious if for all inputs (s1, y1) and
(s2, y2), if |A˜k(s1, y1)| and |A˜k(s2, y2)| are equally distributed then so are A˜k(s1, y1)
and A˜k(s2, y2). In other words, if the length of the access patterns are equally
distributed, the access patterns are indistinguishable (this is similar to the concept
of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks for encryption schemes).
The oblivious RAM problem only worries about hiding the access pattern. Us-
ing an encryption scheme that is IND-CPA secure to encrypt the values being
stored before sending them to the MEM prevents the values being stored from
leaking information (see Section A). Since we know the values cannot leak infor-
mation, we only need to concern ourselves with checking if the access pattern leaks
information when evaluating solutions to the oblivious RAM problem.
An oracle-RAM is said to obliviously simulate a program if no information
about the access pattern of the program running on a deterministic RAM can be
learned from the access pattern when it runs on the oracle-RAM. More formally,
given an oracle-RAMk and a deterministic RAM ′k′ , RAMk obliviously simulates
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RAM ′k′ if these three conditions hold:
• RAMk is oblivious
• ∀(s, y), ∀RO, the output of RAMk(s, y) when given access to RO in the form
of a random oracle is the same as RAM ′k′(s, y)
• The running time of RAMk(s, y) is determined by RAM ′k′(s, y)
3.2.1 Oblivious RAM Security Games
Constructing a formal security game for the oblivious RAM problem is made dif-
ficult by one key requirement in the problem: the two access patterns in question,
A˜k(s0, y0) and A˜k(s1, y1), must have lengths that are equally distributed. However,
the length of the access patterns is a random variable and there may not be a way
to know if the access patterns generated by two different inputs are equally dis-
tributed. In the security game, the adversary must at minimum be given access to
an access pattern oracle in a similar manner to the encryption oracle in the IND-
CPA security game (Section 2.4). The access pattern oracle would be presented
with two inputs to the RAMk, (s0, y0) and (s1, y1), and using the left-right function
LR(·, ·, ·), choose one of the inputs and return the access pattern for that input if
the lengths are equally distributed. Otherwise, if the lengths of the access patterns
are not equally distributed, ⊥ is returned. The question is how does the adversary
and the access pattern oracle determine that the lengths are equally distributed.
The naive way is to have the access pattern oracle run the RAM on both inputs.
If the access patterns generated are not of the same length, the oracle would return
⊥. However, the adversary would have no way of knowing in advance if the access
patterns are of the same length and this would unfairly penalize it (unlike the
IND-CPA game where the adversary decides whether or not the messages are of
the same length).
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The Naive Oblivious RAM Security Game
The naive oblivious RAM security game tests whether or not an adversary can
distinguish between access patterns (Figure 3.5). To set up the ORAM game, a
function RO is chosen uniformly at random and is given to RAMk as a random
oracle. Additionally, a bit b is chosen uniformly at random. The adversary A sends
pairs of inputs ((s0, y0), (s1, y1)) to the access pattern oracle AP (see Figure 3.4).
If |A˜k(s0, y0)| 6= |A˜k(s1, y1)|, ⊥ is returned. Otherwise A˜k(sb, yb) is returned. A is
allowed to query AP as many times as it wants but is only allowed to run for 2O(k)
time. When A halts, it outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, then A wins.
Oracle AP (RAMk, LR((s0, y0), (s1, y1), b)):
if |A˜k(s0, y0)| 6= |A˜k(s1, y1)|
return ⊥
run RAMk(sb, yb)
return A˜k(sb, yb)
Figure 3.4: The Access Pattern Oracle
b
A
World 0
AP (RAMk,LR((s0, y0),
(s1, y1), 0))
A˜k(s0, y0) or ⊥
((s0, y0), (s1, y1))
World 1
AP (RAMk,LR((s0, y0),
(s1, y1), 1))
A˜k(s1, y1) or ⊥
((s0, y0), (s1, y1))
Figure 3.5: The Naive Oblivious RAM Security Game
If we are in World 0, the instance of the ORAM game with adversary A and
encryption schemeRAMk is called the World 0 experiment orExporam-0RAMk (A) (Figure
3.6) and Exporam-1RAMk (A) in World 1 (Figure 3.7). Like the IND-CPA security game
(Section 2.4), the advantage of the adversary is defined as the probability that it
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actually guesses it is in World 1 when it is in World 1 minus the probability that
it guesses it is in World 1 when it is really in World 0:
AdvoramRAMk(A) = Pr
(
Exporam-1RAMk (A) = 1
)− Pr (Exporam-0RAMk (A) = 1) (3.1)
Again, for a RAMk to be considered oblivious, the advantage should be close to 0,
indicating that the best adversary cannot do better than randomly guessing which
world it is in.
Experiment Exporam-0RAMk (A):
b
$←AAP (RAMk,LR((·,·),(·,·),0))
return b
Figure 3.6: The Naive ORAM Experiment in World 0
Experiment Exporam-1RAMk (A):
b
$←AAP (RAMk,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))
return b
Figure 3.7: The Naive ORAM Experiment in World 1
Oblivious RAMs with a Deterministic Increase in Access Pattern Length
There is a special exception to the problem of knowing the distribution of the
access pattern; specifically, if the access pattern generated by the oblivious RAM
is a constant factor larger than the original access pattern. In fact, all of the
solutions we will discuss in this paper increase the access pattern length by a
constant multiple. In this case, the adversary can determine how long the access
pattern of the oblivious RAM should be so we have no need to avoid penalizing
the adversary for bad queries to the left-right oracle. For these solutions, the naive
ORAM experiment is sufficient (Section 3.2.1).
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3.3 A Related Problem: The Outsourced Data Model
A similar problem to that of oblivious RAM simulation is the outsourced data
model [4]. In this model, the client has a large amount of data they want to store,
say of size n, and they have purchased this amount of space from a server provider
(such as a cloud computing service). Like the RAM model, the data on the server
is indexed and the client will make indexed queries to the memory. On their local,
trusted computers the client only has a fraction of this memory, on the order of
O(n
1
r ) for some constant r > 1. The server provider is potentially malicious so the
client does not fully trust them. Perhaps the server provider has some financial
interest in learning about the client’s data or perhaps an employee is stealing
information to sell to the client’s competitors. In this case, simply encrypting
information may not hide enough information. As we have seen, information can
still be leaked despite using encryption [2]. The client would want their accesses
to be data oblivious to prevent these side channel attacks.
A computation is said to be data oblivious, if for two unique memory config-
urations of the same size, an access pattern is equally likely to be seen with each
configuration. A memory configuration is the physical layout of the memory as
well as the values currently stored at each location. More formally, for memory
configurationsM andM ′, whereM 6= M ′ and |M | = |M ′|, and an access sequence
S, the probability that we see S given M is the same that we see S given M ′:
Pr(S|M) = Pr(S|M ′)
The property of data obliviousness is as general as the oblivious RAM problem;
solutions meeting either definition will only leak information about the running
time and amount of memory used. Either of these pieces could also be obscured
by padding either the memory or the execution with fake data and additional
computations. Unlike the oblivious RAM problem, this solution does not include
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the requirement that the access patterns be equally distributed, removing one of
the more significant complications in proving that a solution provides oblivious
simulation. Going forward, one suspects that this will the more useful definition.
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Chapter 4
THE SQUARE ROOT SOLUTION
Intuitively, it is trivial to hide the actual memory locations a program wants to
access by having the RAM read and then write every item in memory for each
access in the original program. Because we access all of the locations each time,
an adversary could not determine which location we were truly interested in. Un-
fortunately, this is not the best solution because it has a large overhead: if m
words of memory are required by the original RAM, the oblivious RAM requires
2m accesses per original access. Instead of scanning everything, in the square root
solution, a relatively small number of locations are scanned, along with regular
reshuﬄing of the words in memory. This solution was originally proposed via two
papers by Ostrovsky and Goldreich [3, 8]. We we detail and analyze the square
root solution in this section, as well as propose our own modifications.
We know that this solution must be based on the use of an oracle-RAM. Recall
from our discussion of the oblivious RAM problem (Section 3.2) that an adversary
would query the access pattern oracle with two different inputs ((s0, y0), (s1, y1)).
The oracle would choose one of these inputs, execute the RAM on it and return
the resulting access pattern. Suppose that we used a deterministic RAM instead
of an oracle-RAM for the solution. If the adversary sent the same (s0, y0) each
time and a different (s1, y1) it could determine with high probability which world
it was in. If the adversary was in World 0, the oracle would always execute the
RAM on (s0, y0). Since the RAM is deterministic, this would generate the same
access pattern each time. If the adversary was in World 1, then it would expect
to see a different access pattern each time. This tells us that we need to use an
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oracle-RAM to implement our solution.
The oblivious oracle-RAMk is given access to some extra memory besides the
m words used by the original RAM ′k′ (see Figure 4.1). Our oblivious oracle-RAMk
should provide the same functionality as the original RAM ′k′ (in other words, for
a given input, both RAMs should return the same output). The extra memory is
divided into two parts; half are referred to as dummy locations and the other half
as the shelter. Specifically,
√
m dummy locations and
√
m shelter locations are
added. The dummy and shelter words are used to hide whether or not RAMk has
accessed the same word more than once in a pass (more on this shortly). The first
m words in RAMk’s memory are initialized to contain the same values as the m
words in RAM ′k′ ’s memory. Specifically, the words in RAMk are of the form (i, vi),
where vi is the value originally stored at word i in RAM ′k′ . The dummy locations
are words in memory that are initialized to a dummy value and are not used by
the program being simulated. The shelter locations are used to temporarily hold
the words that were accessed in one pass of the oblivious simulation. The shelter
locations are also initialized to a dummy value.
m words of memory in original RAM ′k′
m words of program memory
√
m dummy
words
√
m shelter
words
m+ 2
√
m words of memory in oblivious RAMk
Figure 4.1: Memory Setup for RAMk
The square root solution works in cycles, simulating
√
m memory accesses of
the original RAM ′k′ at a time (we will call this a pass). We will refer to the oracle
that RAMk is given access to as RO. RAMk at a high level works as follows for
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pass g:
1. count← 0
2. Construct a random permutation pi : [m+
√
m] → [m+√m] using the
function RO
3. Permute the first m+
√
m words in RAMk’s memory according to pi (e.g. if
pi(3) = 6, we would move (3, v3) to the sixth word in RAMk)
4. For j = h + 1, h + 2, . . . , h +
√
m, where h = (g − 1)√m, simulate memory
access j of the original RAM ′k′ (the access will be of the form (ij, aj, vj) where
ij is the instruction, aj is an address and vj is a value):
(a) Scan shelter for the word that contains address aj
(b) If aj is not found in the shelter, look for it at location pi(aj) in one of
the non-shelter locations
(c) If aj was found in the shelter, access a dummy location pi(m+ count)
(d) Scan the shelter again, reading then writing back a reencrypted value
for each word. If aj was previously found in the shelter, update its
value (if needed). Otherwise write (aj, vaj) into the first empty shelter
location
(e) count← count+ 1
5. Put each of the program words back in their original location
Each of these steps is key to obtaining oblivious simulation of the original program.
Recall from Section 3.2 that an IND-CPA secure scheme is used to encrypt the
value being stored each time it is written, so the square root solution only needs
to hide the access pattern and obscure whether a read or write is being done.
If the accesses made when the values stored in the non-shelter locations are
permuted are independent of the data stored in the RAMk and the values are
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reencrypted at each step, then the adversary will not be able to tell which values
end up in each location (steps 2 and 3). By scanning the shelter and then accessing
only one non-shelter location (steps 4a, 4b and 4c), the algorithm obscures whether
or not the same value has been accessed twice since the adversary, again due to
encryption, cannot tell whether or not a dummy location or a program memory
location has been accessed. Then the entire shelter is read and written back,
obscuring which shelter location was written to (step 4d). Once the
√
m accesses
have been simulated, the program memory is returned to its original location (step
5), then repermutes for the next pass (back to steps 2 and 3).
In the remainder of this chapter we will go into more depth on how each of
these steps is implemented and show that no information about the access pattern
is leaked by this solution.
4.1 Overview
As described in the previous section, the m+ 2
√
m memory locations are divided
into three parts. The first m words are program memory and are initialized to
reflect the original state of the original RAM ′k′ . Specifically, a tuple is written to
each word: the work tape address i and the value vi stored at that location (e.g.
if the value 36 was originally stored in the seventh word of RAM ′k′ then (7, 36)
would be written to the seventh word of RAMk). The next
√
m words are dummy
locations initialized to some arbitrary value, which we will denote d, and are used
to obfuscate what is being accessed. The final
√
m locations are called the shelter,
again initialized to a dummy value. The shelter is used to store the values that
have been accessed by the RAMk in this pass of the algorithm. Before the first
pass through the simulation, each word will need to be updated, so it is tagged
with the address it is at. The exception to this is the shelter locations, which will
be tagged with an address of ∞. The program words will look like (i, vi), where
i is the address and vi is the value originally stored there. Dummy words will
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be of the form (i, d) and shelter words will be (∞, d) (we will see why they need
an address of ∞ shortly). An example of the initial work tape memory setup for
RAMk, based on an original RAM ′k′ with a work tape of length four, can be see
in Figure 4.2.
4 words of memory in original RAM ′k′
v1 v2 v3 v4
4 words of program memory
2 dummy words 2 shelter words
8 words of memory in oblivious RAMk
(1, v1) (2, v2) (3, v3) (4, v4) (5, d) (6, d) (∞, d) (∞, d)
Figure 4.2: Initial State of the Work Tape for RAMk
The simulation works in cycles, each cycle simulating
√
m accesses of the orig-
inal RAM. For the sake of simplicity, we will ignore the encryption as described
in Section 3.2. It suffices to remember that each time a value is written, it is
re-encrypted and the ciphertext is written so the value stored changes whether or
not the value was actually updated.1 Initially, the memory needs to be shuﬄed to
hide which locations are truly being accessed. This must be done on every pass,
including the first, or else the adversary could trivially distinguish between access
patterns; without the initial shuﬄe, the first
√
m accesses simulated would access
the same locations as the original program. In the oblivious RAM security game
(see Section 3.2.1), if the adversary simply queried the RAM oracle with the same
(s0, y0) each time but a different (s1, y1), it could guess that it is in the correct
world with high probability, simply by seeing if the first
√
m simulated accesses
1An IND-CPA secure encryption scheme is probabilistic, stateful or both. This allows the
encryption scheme to generate different ciphertexts each time the same plaintext is encrypted.
See Section 2.4 for further details.
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are the same for each returned access pattern. Additionally, choosing a new shuf-
fle each time will put the program words in a different location each pass. This
prevents the adversary from learning information by comparing the accesses made
in each pass and prevents multiple passes from leaking information.
Both the program memory and dummy locations will need to be shuﬄed. If
the dummy locations are not included in the shuﬄe, when the algorithm accesses
dummy locations it will always access them in the same portion of memory (in step
4c above). This would leak whether or not the program accessed the same location
multiple times in one pass, again leading to an adversary who could distinguish
between access patterns with high probability. Leaking this information may not
be bad in practice (though it has the potential) but does violate the oblivious RAM
security game (Section 3.2.1).
In order to shuﬄe the memory, the RAM constructs a uniformly random per-
mutation using the random oracle. Let n be the number of items that need to be
permuted (in this case n = m+
√
m). The random oracle can be used to construct
a function f : [n]→ Znlogn such that, with high probability, f(i) is distinct for all
i ∈ [n]. The choice of Znlogn for the range reduces the probability of a collision, as
we will show later, while minimizing the number of bits needed to store the value
computed by f on a particular input. The permutation pi(·) can be constructed as
follows: pi(i) = j if and only if f(i) is the jth smallest element in {f(k) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
(we will explain in Section 4.2.1 why this works). After each pass through the sim-
ulation a new function f will need to be constructed. After f has been constructed,
each non-shelter memory location 1 ≤ i ≤ m+√m is accessed and tagged with the
value f(i). Each non-shelter location now stores a tuple of the tag, virtual address
and value (f(i), i, vi), where vi is the value currently stored at virtual address i.
When scanning for an address aj, RAMk will be looking at the second value in the
tuple (the virtual address). The algorithm will need to know later which f(i) and
i corresponds to the value being read; the only way for it to know this information
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is for each location to store the tuple.
Once all of the memory locations have been tagged, they will need to be sorted
according to the value of f(·) in order to permute them according to pi(·). The
sorting is done via a Batcher Sorting Network (see Section 2.5) [1]. The Batcher
sort is a type of merge sort which makes n · dlog2 ne2 comparisons when sorting n
elements. Crucially, the same comparisons are done each time, regardless of the
items being sorted.
Now that the memory locations have been permuted, RAMk will begin simu-
lating the
√
m accesses of the original RAM ′k′ for this pass through the algorithm.
RAMk keeps a counter, which we will call count, which is initialized to 0. The ith
access will be for some program address ai. To simulate accessing ai, RAMk will
first scan the shelter to see if ai has already been accessed. If program address ai
was not found in the shelter, we will need to find it in a non-shelter location. We
do not know which physical word in RAMk stores ai but we do know f(ai). To
find ai, we perform a binary search over the first m +
√
m words, looking for the
word tagged with f(ai). Once we find ai at some physical word j, we rewrite the
value stored so that the program address is updated to infinity. In other words, the
tuple (f(ai),∞, vai) is written back to the same physical word j where we found
ai (we will see why later). If we found program address ai in the shelter, then we
need to search for one of the dummy words so the access pattern looks the same
regardless of where we find ai. Each time we access a dummy location we need it to
be a unique dummy location that we have not accessed before in this pass. This is
where the counter count comes into play. We perform the binary search, this time
looking for the countth dummy word, which is tagged with f(m + count). When
we find the dummy word at some address j, we re-encrypt it and rewrite the same
value back to the same location. Finally, we scan the shelter again, reading and
then writing each word in place. If ai was previously found in the shelter, when
we get to that word it is rewritten with the potentially updated value for vai . If
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ai was not in the shelter already, it is written to the first empty word found in the
shelter (the first word tagged with an address of∞). Once this scan of the shelter
is complete, count is incremented by 1 and the next memory access is simulated.
Once all of the
√
m access in this pass have been simulated, we need to get
all of the words back to their original position. This is for one of two reasons. In
the first case, if this is not the last pass through the algorithm, we will need to
repermute the words to obscure the next
√
m simulated accesses, as well as clear
the shelter. By returning all of the words to their original location, the shelter will
no longer contain program words, making the shelter ready for the next pass. The
program words and dummy words are back in the first m +
√
m locations, ready
to be shuﬄed according to a new permutation. In the second case, if this is our
last pass, when the CPU portion of RAMk sends the halt message to the MEM,
the MEM prints out its work tape until it hits a special symbol (see Section 3.1).
If we have not returned the words to their original location, RAMk will output
something different than what the original RAM ′k′ returned, and thus would violate
the operational requirements of oblivious simulation.
Before we describe how the words are returned to their original location, we
should assure ourselves that each program word and each dummy word only exist
in one location. If a program word was not accessed in this pass, then it could
trivially only be in one location since it was never written. Specifically, it will be
somewhere in the firstm+
√
m words, as determined by our permutation pi(·). If we
did access some program word ai in this pass, the first time we accessed it we found
it in some non-shelter location at physical address j. After we read the word, we
rewrote the tuple at address j and updated the program address to ∞ (originally
(f(ai), ai, vai) would be stored at address j, after the update (f(ai),∞, vai) would
be stored there), and then wrote the tuple for ai into the shelter. If ai was accessed
subsequently, the value was updated in the shelter location, so the word tagged
with program address ai only exists in one location. The dummy words only exist
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in one location, too, since we never moved them into the shelter. Finally, the
unused shelter locations will be tagged with an address of ∞ so we can safely
ignore them.
To return the words to their original location, we need to do a Batcher sort
across all m + 2
√
m words based on the address they are tagged with (a Batcher
sort is used because is it deterministic; see Section 2.5). The program words will
end up in the first m words since they are tagged with addresses 1 to m. The
dummy words, tagged with addresses m + 1 to m +
√
m will end up in the next
√
m words. Finally the shelter words, all tagged with an address of ∞ because
they were either words accessed during this pass or are unused shelter locations,
will be in the last
√
m words. Now that everything has been returned to its original
position, RAMk can halt if there are no more steps to simulate, or the next
√
m
steps can be simulated.
Initial State
(1, 18) (2, 13) (3, 42) (4, 6) (5, d) (6, d) (∞, d) (∞, d)
Each Non-Shelter Value is Tagged with f(·) where f : [6]→ [24]
(16, 1, 18) (21, 2, 13) (9, 3, 42) (11, 4, 6) (7, 5, d) (13, 6, d) (∞, d) (∞, d)
A Batcher Sort is Performed Across Non-Shelter Words Based on the f(·) Tag
(7, 5, d) (9, 3, 42) (11, 4, 6) (13, 6, d) (16, 1, 18) (21, 2, 13) (∞, d) (∞, d)
Program Location 3 is Accessed and Moved into the Shelter
(7, 5, d) (9,∞, 42) (11, 4, 6) (13, 6, d) (16, 1, 18) (21, 2, 13) (9, 3, 26) (∞, d)
Program Location 1 is Accessed and Moved into the Shelter
(7, 5, d) (9,∞, 42) (11, 4, 6) (13, 6, d) (16,∞, 18) (21, 2, 13) (9, 3, 26) (16, 1, 5)
A Batcher Sort is Performed Across All Words Based on Physical Address
(16, 1, 5) (21, 2, 13) (9, 3, 26) (11, 4, 6) (7, 5, d) (13, 6, d) (9,∞, 42) (16,∞, 18)
Figure 4.3: A Sample Round
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In summary, the simulation works as follows for pass j (a sample round2 can
be seen in Figure 4.3):
1. Construct f : [n]→ [nlogn] where n = m+√m.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m +√m, tag each word with f(i). Each non-shelter word will
now be of the form (f(i), i, vi).
3. Perform a Batcher sort across all non-shelter locations based on the value of
f(·).
4. Initialize count to 0.
5. For i = (j − 1)√m+ 1, . . . , (j − 1)√m+√m, simulate access i for program
address ai:
(a) Scan shelter for address ai
(b) If ai is not found in the shelter, do a binary search over the non-shelter
locations looking for the word tagged with f(ai). When ai is found,
rewrite the value so the virtual address is now ∞.
(c) If ai was found in the shelter, do a binary search over the non-shelter
locations looking for dummy wordm+count which is tagged with f(m+
count). Re-encrypt and rewrite the word when found.
(d) Scan the shelter, rewriting each value after it is read. If ai is already in
the shelter, update the value if needed. Otherwise put the tuple for ai
in the first empty shelter location.
(e) Increment count by 1.
6. Perform a Batcher sort based on the address each word is tagged with across
all words in memory to return everything back to its original location
2See appendix B for more detailed information
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4.2 Proving the Square Root Solution is Oblivious
We will build our proof that the square root solution provides oblivious simulation
in pieces. First we will show that pi(·) is a uniformly random permutation. Next we
will show that the binary searches do not add any information about the memory
being accessed. Finally, we will construct the access pattern and show that one
pass through the simulation does not leak any information besides the running
time and amount of memory used, nor do multiple passes through the simulation.
4.2.1 pi(·) is a Uniformly Random Permutation
Before we show that pi(·) is a random permutation, let us review how it is con-
structed. Given n = m +
√
m, some constant c1 on the order of 2k and another
constant c2 > 0, our random oracle will be chosen from the set of functions that
map from [c1n] to Zc2nlogn :
RO ∈ {g(·) | g : [c1n]→ Zc2nlogn}
The specific random oracle that we get will be chosen uniformly at random from
this set when the security game is set up. We do not have any control over the
exact oracle that is selected. The domain for the random oracle is sufficiently
large so that we do not query the random oracle with the same input twice. Since
the adversary in the ORAM game cannot run for longer than O(2k) time (Section
3.2.1), then c1 on the order of 2k is sufficiently large. Recall that the function f
that we use to construct pi(·) maps [n] to Znlogn (Section 4.1). For some input to
f , we want it equally likely to map to any point in Znlogn . For any given input, the
random oracle will output a uniformly random point in its range. If the range of
f evenly divides the range of the random oracle, as we have chosen, then we can
construct such an f .
The function f : [n] → Znlogn (in this case n = m +
√
m) is constructed using
32
the random oracle, and we will need to construct a unique f for each pass through
the simulation. To do so, the RAM needs to keep an internal counter, which we
will call passes and initialize to 0. After each pass through the simulation passes
will be incremented by 1. For each pass, f(·) is created as follows for i = 1, . . . , n:
f(i) = RO(passes · n+ i) (mod nlogn)
Now that we have constructed f(·), we can create our permutation pi : [n]→ [n]
as follows: pi(i) = j if and only if f(i) is the jth smallest value in {f(1), f(2), . . . ,
f(n)}, assuming there are no collisions. We need to show that pi(·) is a uniformly
random permutation. Assume that pi(·) is not a uniformly random permutation.
This means there exists some value i ∈ [n] such that Pr (pi(i) = j) > 1
n
for some j.
Since pi(·) is created using f(·), this equivalently means that the probability that
f(i) is the jth smallest number in {f(1), f(2), . . . , f(n)} is greater than 1
n
. This
means that f(i) is weighted toward some subset of Znlogn , which contains at least
one element l. In other words Pr(f(i) = l) > 1
nlogn
. However we have already
shown that Pr(f(i) = l) = 1
nlogn
, which is a contradiction, therefore pi must be a
uniformly random permutation.
Finally, we just need to show that the chance of collisions in f(·) is small. First,
let us consider the probability that f(·) has no collisions. Let P (n, k) = n!
(n−k)! be
the number of ways to choose an ordered subset of k items from a set of n items.
If there are no collisions, each of the n items in the domain must map to a unique
element in Znlogn . This is the same as choosing n items from a set of nlogn items,
giving us P
(
nlogn, n
)
possible mappings with no collisions. If we allow collisions,
we have
(
nlogn
)n possible mappings for f(·), giving us a probability of P(nlogn,n)
(nlogn)
n
that there are no collisions. Therefore the chance that we do have a collision is:
Pr (collision) = 1− P
(
nlogn, n
)
(nlogn)n
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We know that for n  k, P (n, k) ≈ nk. For some large n, nlogn  n, which tells
us that P
(
nlogn, n
) ≈ (nlogn)n. With this, our probability of a collision can be
changed as follows:
Pr (collision) = 1− P
(
nlogn, n
)
(nlogn)n
≈ 1−
(
nlogn
)n
(nlogn)n
≈ 1− 1
≈ 0
Therefore, for large n, the probability that we have a collision in f(·) is close to
zero.
4.2.2 The Binary Search Does Not Leak Information
Next we will show that the binary searches performed do not leak any information
besides the physical word they lead to and do not give any indication about the
virtual address stored in that location. This allows us to reduce the binary search
access pattern to simply the word it leads to. The binary searches are done over the
first m+
√
m words. A uniformly random permutation pi(·) was constructed using
f(·). We can view the binary search as paths through the binary tree constructed
by pi(·), where pi(i) = m+
√
m
2
is the root, pi(j) = m+
√
m
4
and pi(k) = 3(m+
√
m)
4
are
the children of the root and so on. The words accessed by the binary search for
some word pi(l) is the same as the path through the binary tree from the root to
the node containing pi(l) [6].
Suppose we construct an adversary that given a value pi(i) tries to guess the
value i. Since pi(·) is a uniformly random permutation, the adversary cannot do
better than guessing the value of i and each possible value has the same chance of
being right, in this case 1
m+
√
m
. Now suppose that instead of permuting using pi(·),
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we split the binary tree into the individual search paths that lead to each node
and randomly assign each path to an address i. If we give the adversary the search
path, it cannot do better than randomly guessing which value i it corresponds to
since the paths are selected with equal probability. This tells us that the binary
search path does not give any more information that simply the node it ends at,
so we can eliminate the binary search from the access pattern and simply replace
it with the physical word where the search halts.
4.2.3 Constructing the Access Pattern
Now that we know we can skip the binary search, let us construct the access
pattern for one pass through the simulation before getting into the whole proof.
First, each non-shelter location needs to be tagged. To do this the RAM will first
need to read, then write back the value stored in each word. The access pattern
for this part will be:
(
1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, . . . ,m+
√
m,m+
√
m
)
Next, the Batcher sort is performed. It will take (m +
√
m) · dlog(m + √m)e2
comparisons, and will need to perform two reads and two writes per comparison.
This means there will be 4(m+
√
m) · dlog(m+√m)e2 accesses for the sort, which
we will denote by: (
b1, b2, . . . , b4(m+√m)·dlog(m+√m)e2
)
Then we will need to simulate the
√
m accesses from the original RAM. For one
original access, we will read the entire shelter (
√
m accesses), then read and write
one non-shelter location since we can skip the binary search (2 accesses), and
finishing by reading and writing the entire shelter (2
√
m accesses). This will be
done a total of
√
m times, leading to (2 + 3
√
m)
√
m = 2
√
m+ 3m accesses, which
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we will denote by: (
a1, a2, . . . , a2√m+3m
)
Finally, we will need to return everything to its original location using another
Batcher sort. This one is over m+ 2
√
m locations, giving us an access pattern of:
(
b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
4(m+2
√
m)·dlog(m+2√m)e2
)
For one pass through the simulation, the complete access pattern will be:
(
1, 1, 2, 2, . . . ,m+
√
m,m+
√
m, b1, b2, . . . , b4(m+√m)·dlog(m+√m)e2 ,
a1, a2, . . . , a2√m+3m, b
′
1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
4(m+2
√
m)·dlog(m+2√m)e2
)
4.2.4 One Pass Through the Simulation Does Not Leak Information
We need to show that one pass through the simulation does not leak any informa-
tion about the memory accesses being simulated besides the number of accesses.
We can start by eliminating the accesses that are the same every pass from our
access pattern. To begin with, our access pattern for one pass looks like:
(
1, 1, 2, 2, . . . ,m+
√
m,m+
√
m, b1, b2, . . . , b4(m+√m)·dlog(m+√m)e2 ,
a1, a2, . . . , a2√m+3m, b
′
1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
4(m+2
√
m)·dlog(m+2√m)e2
)
The accesses to update the tags are the same every pass, so we can remove them:
(1, 1, 2, 2, . . . ,m+
√
m,m+
√
m)
leaving: (
b1, b2, . . . , b4(m+√m)·dlog(m+√m)e2 , a1, a2, . . . , a2√m+3m,
b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
4(m+2
√
m)·dlog(m+2√m)e2
)
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as the portion that can leak information. We can also remove both Batcher sorts:
(
b1, b2, . . . , b4(m+√m)·dlog(m+√m)e2
)
and: (
b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
4(m+2
√
m)·dlog(m+2√m)e2
)
since the steps performed by the sort only depend on the number of items being
sorted and not the values being sorted, leaving us:
(
a1, a2, . . . , a2√m+3m
)
When we simulate one access, we scan the shelter twice. The shelter scans are
the same for each simulated access so those can be removed as well. For one
simulated access, 3
√
m + 2 accesses are made; for the ith simulated access where
k = (i − 1)(3√m + 2) is the number of accesses already made in this pass, the
accesses would be:
(
ak+1, ak+2, . . . , ak+√m, ak+√m+1, ak+√m+2, ak+√m+3, ak+√m+4, . . . , ak+3√m+2
)
The first
√
m accesses: (
ak+1, ak+2, . . . , ak+√m
)
are the first scan of the shelter and can be removed. The next two accesses:
(
ak+√m+1, ak+√m+2
)
are the read and the write to the non-shelter location and need to remain in the
access pattern for now. The final 2
√
m accesses:
(
ak+√m+3, ak+√m+4, . . . , ak+3√m+2
)
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are the second scan of the shelter, where each shelter word is read and then rewrit-
ten, which we can remove. This reduces the portion of our access pattern that can
leak information to:
(
a√m+1, a√m+2, a4√m+3, a4√m+4, . . . , a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+1,
a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+2, . . . , a3m−1, a3m
)
which are the accesses to the non-shelter locations. Each non-shelter location is
accessed twice, once to read and once to write, one immediately after another.
This tells us accesses:
a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+1
and
a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+2
are the same for i = 1, . . . ,
√
m. The double access to the same location does not
add any additional information, so we can remove the second access to the same
location, a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+2, leaving us with:
(
a√m+1, a4√m+3, a7√m+5, . . . , a(i−1)(3√m+2)+√m+1, . . . , a3m−1
)
as the portion of the access pattern that can leak information. We know by defini-
tion of the square root solution that none of these accesses are to the same word.
We are either accessing program word ai for the first time (physical address is
pi(ai)) or if this is not the first time we are accessing ai we found it in the shelter
and we are accessing a dummy location. If we are accessing a dummy location, we
know we never access the same dummy location twice because the counter count
is incremented after each simulated memory access. Because we never access the
same memory location twice, the physical accesses themselves are the only thing
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that could leak information. However, since pi(·) is a uniformly random permuta-
tion, the adversary cannot do better than guessing which word is currently stored
in that location. Therefore, the only thing that is leaked by these accesses is the
number of accesses being simulated which does not allow the adversary to learn
any additional information about the underlying access pattern of the program
being simulated.
4.2.5 Multiple Passes Do Not Add Information
Now that we know one pass does not leak information besides the number of
accesses, we need to show that multiple passes through the simulation do not add
information. For each pass a new permutation is chosen uniformly at random.
Because the new permutation is independent of the previous permutation, the
locations accessed during one pass are independent of the locations accessed in the
second pass even if the same memory locations are accessed. This means that one
pass through the simulation does not give the adversary any information about
the next pass. Therefore, the square root solution does not leak any information
besides the output, running time and amount of memory used and is thus oblivious.
4.3 Why the Shelter and Dummy Elements are Needed
The shelter and dummy elements are a key pieces of the square root solution for
providing oblivious simulation. Before getting into the details of why, we will
quickly review the security game in question (see Section 3.2.1 for the details). In
the oblivious RAM security game, the adversary is allowed to query the access
pattern oracle with two RAM inputs. The oracle runs one of the programs and
returns the access pattern. The adversary, after sending some number of queries,
then guesses which inputs were being run on the RAM. If the adversary can guess
with high probability which inputs are being used, then the adversary must be
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learning some information from the access patterns returned by the oracle (in
this case we say that the RAM is leaking some sort of information via the access
pattern). Both the shelter and the dummy elements are required pieces of the
square root solution to prevent the access pattern from leaking any information.
The shelter is used to hide multiple accesses to the same word during one
pass. If there was not a space to put the words already accessed, the RAM would
need to re-access those words in their original location. If we accessed the same
word in the same location twice between reshuﬄes, it would leak information and
potentially allow the adversary to distinguish between the two RAM inputs sent
to the access pattern oracle in the ORAM game (one may access a unique location
every time, while another accesses the same location twice, giving the adversary
enough information to correctly guess which input goes with the access pattern).
The other alternative would be to start a new pass if we try to access the same
location twice during a pass. However, this would leak information too. The
adversary would see that a reshuﬄe of the memory was done too soon and could
distinguish between this and another RAM input that did not access the same
location twice during a pass. For these two reasons the shelter must be available
for the RAM to use.
Now, suppose we do not have the dummy elements and simply have the shelter.
The first time we access a program address during a pass, we would scan the shelter,
read/write one non-shelter address and then scan and update the shelter. If we did
not have the dummy elements, the second time we accessed a program address, we
would scan the shelter, find the location, then scan and update the shelter again
without accessing a non-shelter location. Again, this could potentially allow the
adversary to distinguish between access patterns in the ORAM security game. A
potential alternative to using dummy elements would be to read a real element
that has not been read already but this has an unacceptable overhead. This is
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because the CPU portion of the RAM, which has a limited work tape,3 would
need to keep track of the program addresses that have been accessed so far, up to
√
m addresses at a time. Because of the limited internal state, the CPU cannot
afford to keep track of this information. The final alternative would have the RAM
randomly selected a program word, check if that word has already been accessed,
and if it has not, go ahead and access it. However, the only way for the RAM to
know if it had been accessed would be to scan the shelter. These additional scans
of the shelter would leak information to the adversary. Accesses patterns could be
distinguished based on whether or not there are extra scans of the shelter. This
leaves the
√
m dummy elements as the only acceptable option to hide multiple
accesses to the same program word in one pass.
From here, the next obvious question is why
√
m shelter and dummy locations
are used. First, it should be explained that we need to have at least as many
dummy locations as shelter locations or else the square root solution breaks down
(if we have
√
m shelter locations, less than
√
m dummy locations and we read the
same program address
√
m times in one pass we would run out of dummy elements
to access). We also do not need more dummy locations than shelter locations
because we would never access the extra locations in a single pass. The choice
of
√
m locations is a cost trade off on space. If we choose a smaller value, fewer
original accesses could be simulated in one pass and the memory would need to be
reshuﬄed more frequently (ifm is the number of original memory locations and n is
the number of dummy locations as well as the number of shelter locations, the total
cost of both Batcher sorts would be (m+n)·dlog2(m+n)e2+(m+2n)·dlog2(m+2n)e2
). However, if we choose a larger value, the cost of simulating a single access
increases significantly. Again, if n is the number of shelter locations it would take
3n + 2 accesses to simulate a single access and (3n + 2)n accesses to simulate an
3Recall from Section 3.1 that the CPU has a small amount of memory on its work tape while
the MEM has a much larger work tape.
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entire pass. The choice of
√
m balances both costs to a reasonable amount.
4.4 Improvements
A simple improvement can be made that removes roughly two thirds of the accesses
per pass through the simulation. First, recall how a single access is simulated now,
with a cost of 3
√
m+ 2, ignoring the accesses for the binary searches:
• Read the shelter, looking for the program address ai (
√
m accesses)
• If i is found, read one dummy location at pi(m + count), else read pi(ai).
Write an updated value to that location where the program address is∞. (2
accesses)
• Scan the entire shelter, reading than writing back each word. If ai is already
in the shelter, update the existing value if needed when read. Otherwise
write to first empty location. (2
√
m accesses)
This is done
√
m times for a total of 3m+2
√
m accesses per pass. Suppose instead
we take advantage of the internal counter count (that is used to access dummy
locations). count is incremented each pass, whether or not a dummy location was
accessed. We can use count to track how far into the shelter we need to scan and
which shelter location we should write to next. We will also move the rewrite of
shelter values to the first scan of the shelter. A single access will now be simulated
as follows:
• Scan shelter locations 1 to count − 1, reading then rewriting every value,
looking for program address ai. If ai is found in the shelter, update the
program address to ∞ when rewriting the word. (2(count− 1) accesses)
• If ai was found in the shelter, read one dummy location at pi(m + count)
and rewrite the same value back to that location. Otherwise, read pi(ai) and
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write an updated value to that location with a program address of ∞. (2
accesses)
• Write ai into the shelter at location m +
√
m + count (this will be the next
empty shelter location). (1 access).
With this method, one simulated access will take 2(count − 1) + 3 accesses for a
total of m+2
√
m accesses per pass through the simulation which is roughly a third
of the original cost. We simply need to show that this method does not leak any
additional information over the original square root solution.
The construction of pi(·), both Batcher sorts and the binary searches are the
same in both versions, so we can eliminate those from being potential leaks in our
new version. The non-shelter accesses will also be the same in both versions so
that cannot leak any additional information as well. This leaves the scan of the
shelter and the write to the shelter as the only source of additional information
left. If we construct the access pattern for this portion, we will see a write to the
first shelter location, then a read/write to the first location and a write to the
second, and so on until we read/write the entire shelter except the last position
then write to the last position. This gives us an access pattern of:
(
m+
√
m+ 1,m+
√
m+ 1,m+
√
m+ 1,m+
√
m+ 2,m+
√
m+ 1,
m+
√
m+ 1,m+
√
m+ 2,m+
√
m+ 2,m+
√
m+ 3,m+
√
m+ 1,
m+
√
m+ 1,m+
√
m+ 2,m+
√
m+ 2,m+
√
m+ 3,m+
√
m+ 3,
m+
√
m+ 4, . . . ,m+
√
m+
√
m− 1,m+√m+√m− 1,m+√m+√m)
This portion of the access pattern will be the same each pass through the simulation
so it cannot leak any information about the program words that are being accessed.
The only information that can be learned is how many accesses have been done so
far by looking at how far into the shelter we read and write. However, in the original
square root solution, this information can also be learned by counting the number
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of accesses to the non-shelter locations. Therefore, no additional information is
leaked in this version of the square root solution.
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Chapter 5
THE HIERARCHICAL SOLUTION
While the square root solution provides oblivious simulation, more efficient solu-
tions are possible. The first of these is the basic hierarchical solution [8]. In this
solution a series of increasingly larger hash tables are used. Each hash table oper-
ates much like the single buffer of the square root solution. Instead of permuting
the program memory according to a random permutation, as is done in the square
root solution, the values are stored according to a randomly selected hash function
associated with each level. When a sufficient number of accesses have been made,
a new hash function is chosen for that level and the entries stored in that level are
rehashed. For the smaller hash tables, this will occur more frequently, while for
the larger hash tables it will occur infrequently.
Accessing values in this solution is similar in some respects to the square root
solution as well. The highest level hash table (and thus the smallest), is scanned
completely each time like the shelter is scanned in the square root solution. For
each subsequent hash table, one bucket is accessed. If the program address in
question has not been found yet, the RAM will use the hash function for the
level to determine which bucket to scan, otherwise the RAM will choose a random
bucket. Once a bucket has been scanned in each hash table, the entry for the
program address is written into the highest level hash table.
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5.1 Overview
The hierarchical solution is divided into three pieces: how the RAM’s memory is
structured, how program memory is accessed and rehashing of individual levels.
We will cover each of these in turn, building up the solution as we go.
5.1.1 Memory Layout
In the square root solution (Chapter 4), a simple table structure is used for the
memory. The table is large enough to contain the original program data plus
dummy and shelter words used to hide accesses to the same location between
shuﬄes of the memory. The hierarchical model generalizes this structure (see
Figure 5.1). Instead of a single table, a series of hash tables are used. Say a
program has been running on the RAM for t steps (initially t is the length of the
input to the RAM) so far, then each hash table consists of buckets of depth in the
order of O(log t). The hash tables increase rapidly in size as you move from higher
to lower levels; specifically, the hash table at level i contains 4i buckets. As we
will see, the choice of 4i for the number of buckets, combined with how often each
level is rehashed, minimizes the chance of bucket overflows during the simulation.
Each hash table is associated with a specific hash function chosen from the set:
hsi(a) = RO(si · a) (mod 4i) (5.1)
where RO(·) is the random oracle given to the RAM for this simulation and si ∈ N.
si is referred to as the hash function index and specifies which function should be
used. Each hash table is associated with a hash function index which is chosen
uniformly at random for each table.
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Level N
Hash Index sN
4N Buckets
Level i
Hash Index si
4i Buckets
Level 2
Hash Index s2
16 Buckets
Level 1
Hash Index s1
4 Buckets
Figure 5.1: Memory Layout
5.1.2 Accessing Program Memory
The access algorithm for the hierarchical model is a generalization of the access
algorithm of the square root solution (Section 4.1). When the RAM needs to access
program memory location a, it starts by looking at the highest hash table (level
one). At level one, the entire hash table is scanned entry by entry. If a exists at
this level, the RAM remembers the value and continues scanning the rest of the
memory. For the remaining hash tables, the RAM scans the hash table at level
i as follows. First, the RAM computes the hash value of a at that level, hsi(a).
Then it chooses a random bucket in the hash table, which we will denote as j
(j $← [4i]). If a has already been found at a higher level, the RAM scans bucket
j of the hash table. Otherwise, if a has not been found, the RAM scans bucket
hsi(a) and remembers the value if it is found. Once all of the levels have been
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scanned, the (potentially updated) value of (a, v), where v is value associated with
program address a, is written to the first empty bucket in level one.
Most of these steps are directly comparable to the square root solution. Suppose
that during a simulated access in the hierarchical solution, we found the program
address we were looking for in level n. Let us compare the accesses made in this
solution to the square root solution. We begin by scanning the entire hash table in
level one much like we scan the entire shelter. Then, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, we scan bucket
hsi(a) for level i. These accesses are equivalent to the single access to pi(a) in the
square root solution when we did not find the program address in the shelter. In
the hierarchical model, for the accesses to the remaining levels below n, we choose
a bucket at random to scan since we have already found the address in question,
which is a similar idea to reading one of the dummy elements when we find the
address in the shelter in the square root solution.
5.1.3 Rehashing a Level
Rehashing each level at regular intervals is key to providing oblivious simulation.
If we find program memory location a in level i twice, we want the buckets we
scan to be independent of each other, otherwise accessing the same bucket could
leak information about the access pattern. The need for rehashing in this solution
is the same reason we choose a new permutation in each pass of the square root
solution. One could think of the time between the rehashing of a level as a single
pass through the square root solution and choosing a new hash function for the
level would be equivalent to choosing a new permutation for the next pass. Each
time a specific program word is in a level, we want the location to be independent
or else the adversary in the oblivious RAM game may be able to detect a difference
between different inputs to the RAM.
Recall that when accessing program word a, when we find location a in level
i, we move the value to the hash table at the top of the structure. When it comes
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time to move it and the other contents of the highest level hash table into the
second level, we begin the rehash by choosing a new hash function for the second
level. For each rehashing of the contents of level j into level j + 1, we continue to
choose a new hash function uniformly at random for level j + 1. Before we can
move program word a back into level i, we choose a new hash function for level i
like we did all the other levels. Since the hash functions are chosen uniformly at
random, the new bucket location for a is independent of the previous bucket we
found it in (see Section 5.2.1 for further details).
As originally proposed by Ostrovsky, for some level i, every 4i−1 accesses we
move all of the contents of level i into level i + 1 and choose a new hash function
for level i + 1 [8]. Because the smaller levels have a lower cost associated with
rehashing all of the values with the new hash function, these tables are rehashed
more frequently. The larger levels are rehashed infrequently because the cost is
much higher. By rehashing every 4i−1 accesses, we reduce the possibility of a
bucket overflow in level i. However, this hashing needs to be done in an oblivious
manner that prevents the RAM from leaking information. We will describe the
oblivious hash algorithm in Section 5.2.2.
5.2 Proof
Proving that the hierarchical model provides oblivious simulation is best done in
pieces. First we will show that the access pattern for one of the hash table levels
does not leak any information between rehashings. We can consider the accesses to
a single level between rehashings to be equivalent to the accesses to the non-shelter
locations in a single pass of the square root solution. If the accesses to the level
appear to be accessing a randomly selected bucket to an outside observer, then no
information is leaked by these accesses by themselves.
Once we know that the accesses to a single level are oblivious between re-
hashings, we will show that the accesses made by the RAM during rehashing are
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oblivious. If the rehashing steps are not oblivious, they could leak information
about the contents of the two levels in question, which does not meet the standard
of oblivious simulation. The rehashing steps need to be independent of the contents
currently stored in the two levels to prevent the adversary in the oblivious RAM
game (see Section 3.2.1) from learning any information. This step is somewhat
similar to the steps for choosing a new permutation in the square root solution.
Now that we know the accesses made to a level between rehashings and the
rehashing steps, we need to show that looking at a level across multiple rehashings
does not leak any information. Even though the accesses between rehashings do
not leak information, it is possible that looking at the accesses across multiple
rehashings could shed some additional information. In order to provide oblivi-
ous simulation, the hierarchical solution has to prevent this from happening. In
the square root solution, to show that multiple passes do no leak information,
we showed that the permutation selected for each pass was chosen uniformly at
random. For this solution, we will do something very similar; we will show that
the hash function chosen for a level is independent of all the other hash functions
selected.
Put together, these three pieces provide oblivious simulation. We know that
the accesses made between rehashings do not leak information, nor do the steps
during rehashing. Additionally, the accesses made to a level before a rehashing do
not leak any information about the accesses made afterward. Given these facts,
the adversary will not be able to gain enough information to distinguish which
world it is in with high probability.
5.2.1 A Level’s Access Pattern Does Not Leak Information Between
Rehashings
When we look at the hash table at level i in the hierarchical model, we will see 4i−2
accesses to that level between rehashings (recall that level i−1 is rehashed into level
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i every 4i−2 accesses in the original program and we choose a new hash function
for level i at this time). Recall from Section 5.1.2 that the locations accessed are
determined either by the hashed value of the program memory location, or a bucket
chosen at random if the word has already been found. We need to show that all
of the accesses appear to be uniformly random.
If we have already found the program word, we choose a bucket to scan uni-
formly at random. Since these accesses are chosen at random, they will look like
random accesses to the outside observer, so we can eliminate these accesses as a
potential source for leaking information. This leaves the accesses that are deter-
mined by the hash function for the level and we will want them to look uniformly
random too. We know that the RAM will look for program memory word a at most
once at level i between rehashings (Section 5.1.3) so hsi(a) is used to determine
which bucket to look at once at the most. This means we do not have to worry
about querying the hash function on the same input twice. What remains to be
shown, is that the outputs look uniformly random.
Recall from Section 5.1.1 that the hash function is constructed as follows:
hsi(a) = RO(si · a) (mod 4i)
where RO(·) is the random oracle given to the RAM for this simulation and si ∈ N.
The random oracle RO(·) is equally likely to map to any value in its range on some
input. This means that for some input x, RO(x) (mod 4i) is equally likely to map
to any value in Z4i . Since each output is equally likely, the output we actually
see looks like it was chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, the output of hsi(a)
looks uniformly random as well.
Between rehashings, each access looks like a bucket was chosen at random,
regardless of whether we chose a bucket at random or used the hash function to
select on. Since the accesses look random, they cannot leak any information in the
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oblivious RAM security game (see Section 3.2.1).
5.2.2 Rehashing is Oblivious
When one level is rehashed into the next larger level, the hashing needs to be
done in a way that does not leak any information about the words being hashed,
including how many real entries there are at this level. This is referred to as an
oblivious hash and is a key piece of the hierarchical model.
Oblivious Hash Algorithm
When we rehash in the hierarchical model, we have the smaller hash table, which
we will refer to as hash table A, which has n buckets of size m (if table A is at level
i, n = 4i and m is of the order O(log t) where t is the running time so far), and the
larger hash table, hash table B, which has 4n buckets of size m. When we rehash
level A into level B, a new hash function is chosen and associated with hash table
B. We will refer to this new hash function as h′(·). To begin the oblivious hash,
we start by allocating a new hash table, which we will call C, with 5n buckets.
The n buckets of hash table A are copied into the first n buckets of table C while
the 4n buckets of hash table B are copied into the last 4n buckets (see Figure 5.2).
Once the buckets are copied, we scan every word in C. The non-empty words,
(a, v), are tagged with the new hash value determined by h′(·), (h′(a), a, v). In
order to make sure that every bucket of B contains at least one value when we
rehash (we will see why later), we will use the first 4n empty entries we find and
tag an empty entry with one of the bucket numbers (1 to 4n). We know that there
will be at least 4n empty entries since we rehash every 4i−2 accesses and A has 4im
slots available (4i buckets, each of size m). Hash table A will be at most a quarter
full, ensuring that we have at least 4n empty entries. The remaining empty words
found in the hash table are tagged with a value of zero (see Figure 5.3).
Once all of the hash table entries have been tagged, we sort the hash table on
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Hash Table C
(6,
1)
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
(2,
7)
∅
(3,
4)
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
Hash Table B
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
(2,
7)
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
(6,
1)
∅
∅
∅
Hash Table A
(3,
4)
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
Figure 5.2: Example: Initial State of Hash Tables A, B and C
Hash Table C
(14,
3, 4)
(1,
d, d)
(2,
d, d)
(3,
d, d)
(4,
d, d)
(5,
d, d)
(6,
d, d)
(7,
d, d)
(8,
d, d)
(9,
d, d)
(10,
d, d)
(11,
d, d)
(12,
d, d)
(13,
d, d)
(14,
d, d)
(15,
d, d)
(16,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(7,
6, 1)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(1,
2, 7)
(0,
d, d)
Figure 5.3: Example: Tagging the Entries in C with h′(·)
a entry-by-entry basis (see Figure 5.4), treating the hash table as one large array
instead of a hash table (instead of putting each entry into a bucket as determined
by the hash function, we view the hash table as one large traditional array and
apply the sorting algorithm to each individual entry in that array). The empty
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words, tagged with a value of zero, will be in the front of the “array” (the entries in
the buckets at the start of the hash table), while the empty elements tagged with
bucket numbers and the non-empty words will be in the end of the “array” (the
last buckets of the hash table). Any sorting algorithm will do, as long as it makes
deterministic steps that are chosen by the number of items being sorted, such as
the Batcher sort used in the square root solution (Section 2.5).
Hash Table C
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
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d, d)
(0,
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(0,
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(0,
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(0,
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d, d)
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(0,
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(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(1,
2, 7)
(1,
d, d)
(2,
d, d)
(3,
d, d)
(4,
d, d)
(5,
d, d)
(6,
d, d)
(7,
d, d)
(7,
6, 1)
(8,
d, d)
(9,
d, d)
(10,
d, d)
(11,
d, d)
(12,
d, d)
(13,
d, d)
(14,
d, d)
(14,
3, 4)
(15,
d, d)
(16,
d, d)
Figure 5.4: Example: Sorting the Entries in C by Tag
Next, a new hash table, which we will refer to as C ′, is created and contains
5mn buckets. Each word in C is copied in order to the top-most word in the first
empty bucket of C ′ (see Figure 5.5). The words that are copied from C will be
tagged with the values we specified before, while the rest of the entries in C ′ will
be empty entries with no tags.
C ′ is scanned, left to right, as we obliviously sort the words of every two adjacent
buckets. To obliviously sort the buckets, first we scan the non-empty elements of
each bucket. If the tags of the elements are different, we perform the steps of the
oblivious sort without moving any elements. We will not need to actually move the
entries because each bucket consists of entries with a unique tag and the entries
are already in sorted order because of how we copied them from C to C ′.
If the buckets have the same tag, the oblivious sort is performed as follows to
accumulate the empty entries in the first bucket and the non-empty entries (which
all have the same tag) in the second bucket. If a word is empty (i.e. it was not one
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Hash Table C ′
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∅
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∅
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∅
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∅
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∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(1,
2, 7)
∅
(1,
d, d)
∅
(2,
d, d)
∅
(3,
d, d)
∅
(4,
d, d)
∅
(5,
d, d)
∅
(6,
d, d)
∅
(7,
d, d)
∅
(7,
6, 1)
∅
(8,
d, d)
∅
(9,
d, d)
∅
(10,
d, d)
∅
(11,
d, d)
∅
(12,
d, d)
∅
(13,
d, d)
∅
(14,
d, d)
∅
(14,
3, 4)
∅
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∅
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∅
Figure 5.5: Example: The Entries Moved From C to C ′
Hash Table C ′
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∅
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∅
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d, d)
∅
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∅
∅
∅
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∅
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∅
Figure 5.6: Example: Sorting the Entries in Adjacent Buckets in C ′
of the words we copied in from C), we treat it as if it was tagged with a value of
zero. If the word is non-empty (i.e. we copied it from C), we treat it as if it was
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tagged with a value of one. We are using these fake tags for this step since the
empty entries do not have a tag. The oblivious sort using these fake tags is done
using a deterministic sorting algorithm such as the Batcher sort (Section 2.5).
Once we have sorted all of the adjacent buckets, all of the entries with the
same tag will be in one bucket together (see Figure 5.6). All of the buckets with
non-empty entries will be in sorted order by tag, potentially with empty buckets
between them.
Next, we obliviously sort C ′ by buckets (see Figure 5.7). Empty buckets are
treated as being tagged with -1, moving them to the front of the hash table. The
non-empty buckets will be in the last 4n positions (we know there will be 4n since
we tagged empty elements with each of the bucket numbers).
Hash Table C ′
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
∅
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(0,
d, d)
(1,
2, 7)
(1,
d, d)
(2,
d, d)
∅
(3,
d, d)
∅
(4,
d, d)
∅
(5,
d, d)
∅
(6,
d, d)
∅
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d, d)
(7,
6, 1)
(8,
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∅
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∅
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3, 4)
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∅
(16,
d, d)
∅
Figure 5.7: Example: Sorting the Buckets in C ′
The last 4n buckets of C ′ are copied back into B (see Figure 5.8). Finally, we
scan B and eliminate the dummy entries (see Figure 5.9).
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Hash Table B
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∅
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∅
Figure 5.8: Example: Moving the Last 4n Buckets of C ′ into B
Hash Table B
(1,
2, 7)
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∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
∅
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∅
∅
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∅
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∅
∅
Figure 5.9: Example: Eliminate the Dummy Entries in B
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Constructing the Access Pattern for Oblivious Hashing
Given the more complex memory structure used in the hierarchical solution, we
will need a new message form for passing instructions from the CPU to the MEM
in the RAM. In the basic RAM model, our messages are of the form (a, i, v)
where a is the physical address the CPU wishes to access in the MEM, i is the
instruction and v is the value (see Section 3.1 for further details). Now we will
need to specify the hash table and bucket that we are interested in accessing (and
in some cases the specific physical word in the bucket): ((t, b, w) , i, v) where t is
the hash table, b is the bucket, w is the word, i is the instruction and v is the
value. It is important to remember that these messages are specifying physical
locations to access in the MEM and not the program addresses from the original
RAM during oblivious simulation. For example, if the CPU wanted to read the first
value in the fifth bucket of the hash table for the second level, the message would
be ((2, 5, 1) , read,⊥). When we construct the access pattern, the only portion of
the message that we care about is the physical address being accessed, in this case
the tuple (t, b, w) specified above.
Now that we have a message format that works for the hierarchical solution,
we can begin to construct the access pattern created by the oblivious hash. Recall
from Section 5.2.2 that we have the smaller hash table at level i, which we will
call table A, which has n = 4i buckets of size m, where m is of the order O(log t).
Additionally, we have the larger hash table B at level i + 1 which has 4n buckets
of size m. Two additional hash tables are created just for the rehash, table C
which has 5n buckets of size m and table C ′ which has 5mn buckets of size m.
The construction of the access pattern will follow the steps described in Section
5.2.2. To begin with, we need to move everything from hash tables A and B into
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C, which generates accesses to the following physical memory locations:
((A, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 1) , (A, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2, ) , . . . , (A, n,m) , (C, n,m) , (B, 1, 1) ,
(C, n+ 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (C, n+ 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (C, 5n,m))
Next, we scan C and update each value with its new tag, causing these locations
to be accessed:
((C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2) , . . . , (C, 4n,m) , (C, 4n,m))
After updating the tags, C is sorted at the word level using a Batcher sort.
The steps taken by the Batcher sort are predictable and determined solely by the
number of words being sorted. Recall from Section 2.5 that when sorting x items,
the Batcher sort will make xdlog xe2 comparisons which will mean four times that
many accesses (reading the two words being compared and then writing them
back). For the ith comparison, we will denote the two addresses in question as
(C, bi,1, wi,1) and (C, bi,2, wi,2) where bi,1 is the bucket the first entry is in, wi,1 is
the specific word in the bucket that contains it and the same for bi,2 and wi,2 for the
second entry. In this step we are sorting 5mn words, giving us an access pattern
of:
((C, b1,1, w1,1) , (C, b1,2, w1,2) , (C, b1,1, w1,1) , (C, b1,2, w1,2) ,
(C, b2,1, w2,1) , (C, b2,2, w2,2) , (C, b2,1, w2,1) , (C, b2,2, w2,2) , . . . ,(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,1, w5mndlog 5mne2,1
)
,
(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,2, w5mndlog 5mne2,2
)
,(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,1, w5mndlog 5mne2,1
)
,
(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,2, w5mndlog 5mne2,2
))
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Next we create the new hash table C ′ and move each word in C into the top-
most word in the first empty bucket of C ′:
((C, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C, 1, 3) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . ,
(C, 5n,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1))
The next step is more complex when it comes to constructing the access pattern.
We iterate across the buckets of C ′, obliviously sorting every two adjacent buckets.
First we will compare buckets one and two, then two and three, and so on until
we compare buckets 5mn − 1 and 5mn. Let us begin by constructing the access
pattern when we compare buckets i and i + 1. First, we will need to determine if
the entries in the buckets have different tags or the same tag (recall from Section
5.2.2 that at this point all of the entries in each bucket have the same tag or are
empty). To find the tag for bucket i, we will need to read both the first and last
word in the bucket. The non-empty tagged value will be in the first word if we did
not sort bucket i in the previous step because the tags in buckets i− 1 and i were
different (or if i is the first bucket). If we did sort the words in the previous step
because the tags were the same, the non-empty words, of which there will be at
least two, will be accumulated in the end of bucket i, in which case we will want to
read the last word in the bucket to get the tag. We will want to read both the first
and last word in bucket i each time so we do not leak any information about what
was done in the previous step. For the second bucket, we know the non-empty
word is in the first word of the bucket so we only need to read one word. This
gives us an access pattern of:
((C ′, i, 1) , (C ′, i,m) , (C ′, i+ 1, 1))
to find the tags contained in each bucket.
If the tags are the same in both buckets, we perform a Batcher sort across
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both buckets treating the empty words as zero and the non-empty words as one to
accumulate the non-empty words in the second bucket. If the tags are different,
then we perform the same reads and writes as the Batcher sort without moving
any of the words (since the Batcher sort steps are determined only by the number
of items being sorted we know the steps in advance). We are sorting 2m words,
which gives us an access pattern of:
((
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
))
Since we have 5mn buckets, and we compare every pair of adjacent buckets
working left to right, we will have to do this 5mn−1 times. Since the Batcher sort
takes predictable steps, we will be making the same relative accesses each time if
you just consider the two buckets in question. If we look at the access pattern
formed by this, we will simply be adding one to the bucket number on each pass.
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Thus, the complete access pattern for this step will be:
(
(C ′, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1,m) , (C ′, 2, 1) ,
(
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
, (C ′, 2, 1) ,
(C ′, 2,m) , (C ′, 3, 1) ,
(
C ′, b′1,1 + 1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 1, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,1 + 1, w
′
1,1
)
,(
C ′, b′1,2 + 1, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1 + 1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2 + 1, w
′
2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1 + 1, w
′
2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2,2 + 1, w
′
2,2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
, . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 1, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 1,m) ,
(C ′, 5mn, 1) ,
(
C ′, b′1,1 + 5mn− 2, w′1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 5mn− 2, w′1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′1,1 + 5mn− 2, w′1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 5mn− 2, w′1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2,2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,2
))
Now C ′ is obliviously sorted by bucket, treating empty buckets as if they were
tagged with −1 and non-empty buckets as the tag value that is on the words in
the bucket. Once again, this will be done with a Batcher sort which in this case
will take 5mndlog 5mne2 comparisons. For each comparison, we will need to read
every word in both buckets and then write back all of the words in each bucket
according to the Batcher sort. For the ith comparison, this will give us an access
62
pattern of:
((
C ′, b′′i,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′i,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,2, 2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′′i,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′i,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′i,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′i,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′i,2,m
))
For the entire bucket-wise Batcher sort we will have an access pattern of:
((
C ′, b′′1,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′′1,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 2
)
,
. . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,1,m
)
,(
C ′, b′′2,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,2,m
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2,m
))
Finally, we will need to copy the last 4n buckets of C ′ (where the non-empty
buckets accumulated) into B:
((C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . ,
(C ′, 5mn, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (C ′, 5mn, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn,m) , (B, 4n,m))
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and eliminate any dummy entries:
((B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) ,
(B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . , (B, 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . .
(B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
This gives us a complete access pattern of:
((A, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 1) , (A, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2, ) , . . . , (A, n,m) , (C, n,m) , (B, 1, 1) ,
(C, n+ 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (C, n+ 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (C, 5n,m) , (C, 1, 1) ,
(C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2) , . . . , (C, 4n,m) , (C, 4n,m) , (C, b1,1, w1,1) ,
(C, b1,2, w1,2) , (C, b1,1, w1,1) , (C, b1,2, w1,2) , (C, b2,1, w2,1) , (C, b2,2, w2,2) ,
(C, b2,1, w2,1) , (C, b2,2, w2,2) , . . . ,
(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,1, w5mndlog 5mne2,1
)
,(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,2, w5mndlog 5mne2,2
)
,
(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,1, w5mndlog 5mne2,1
)
,(
C, b5mndlog 5mne2,2, w5mndlog 5mne2,2
)
, (C, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C ′, 2, 1) ,
(C, 1, 3) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . , (C, 5n,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (C ′, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1,m) ,
(C ′, 2, 1) ,
(
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2, w
′
1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2, w
′
2,2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,
(C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2,m) , (C ′, 3, 1) ,
(
C ′, b′1,1 + 1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 1, w
′
1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′1,1 + 1, w
′
1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 1, w
′
1,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1 + 1, w
′
2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2,2 + 1, w
′
2,2
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,1 + 1, w
′
2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2 + 1, w
′
2,2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 1, w
′
2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,
. . . , (C ′, 5mn− 1, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 1,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) ,
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(
C ′, b′1,1 + 5mn− 2, w′1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 5mn− 2, w′1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′1,1 + 5mn− 2, w′1,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′1,2 + 5mn− 2, w′1,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2,1
)
,
(
C ′, b′2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2,2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,1 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,1
)
,(
C ′, b′2mdlog 2me2,2 + 5mn− 2, w′2mdlog 2me2,2
)
,(
C ′, b′′1,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 2
)
, . . . ,(
C ′, b′′1,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′1,2, 2
)
,
. . . ,
(
C ′, b′′1,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,1,m
)
,(
C ′, b′′2,2, 1
)
,
(
C ′, b′′2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′2,2,m
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,1,m
)
,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 1
)
,(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
C ′, b′′5mndlog 5mne2,2,m
)
, (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 1) ,
(B, 1, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1,m) , (B, 1,m) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (C ′, 5mn, 2) ,
(B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn,m) , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) ,
. . . , (B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . , (B, 2,m) ,
(B, 2,m) , . . . , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . ,
(B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
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The Access Pattern Does Not Leak Information
Now that we have constructed the access pattern, let us reduce it to the portion
that can leak information. To begin with, we know we can remove all of the
Batcher sorts since the steps made during the Batcher sort are determined only by
the number of items being sorted (Section 2.5). We can remove the sort of C at
the word level, the 5mn− 1 Batcher sorts of adjacent buckets in C ′ and the final
sort of C ′ by buckets, leaving us with an access pattern of:
((A, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 1) , (A, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2, ) , . . . , (A, n,m) , (C, n,m) , (B, 1, 1) ,
(C, n+ 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (C, n+ 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (C, 5n,m) , (C, 1, 1) ,
(C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2) , . . . , (C, 4n,m) , (C, 4n,m) , (C, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1, 1) ,
(C, 1, 2) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C, 1, 3) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . , (C, 5n,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (C ′, 1, 1) ,
(C ′, 1,m) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2,m) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 1, 1) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 1,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 1,m) , (B, 1,m) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . ,
(C ′, 5mn− 4n+ 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (C ′, 5mn, 2) ,
(B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn,m) , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) ,
(B, 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) ,
(B, 2, 2) , . . . , (B, 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) ,
(B, 4n, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
We also know that the steps for copying between tables will be the same each time.
This means we can remove the accesses for copying tables A and B to C, copying
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C to C ′ and copying the last 4n buckets from C ′ to B, leaving us with:
((C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 1) , (C, 1, 2) , (C, 1, 2) , . . . , (C, 4n,m) , (C, 4n,m) , (C ′, 1, 1) ,
(C ′, 1,m) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2,m) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . , (C ′, 5mn− 1, 1) ,
(C ′, 5mn− 1,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . ,
(B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . , (B, 2,m) ,
(B, 2,m) , . . . , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . ,
(B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
The accesses when we update each word in C with its tag created by h′ will be
the same each time as well, reading and then writing back every word in the table.
Since the accesses are the same each time, it is not possible for them to leak
information, leaving us with:
((C ′, 1, 1) , (C ′, 1,m) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2, 1) , (C ′, 2,m) , (C ′, 3, 1) , . . . ,
(C ′, 5mn− 1, 1) , (C ′, 5mn− 1,m) , (C ′, 5mn, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) ,
(B, 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . ,
(B, 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 2) ,
(B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
We already removed the accesses from the Batcher sorts of C ′ when we compared
adjacent buckets, but we still have the accesses remaining from when we looked
at the buckets to determine their tags, which for the ith pair of buckets would be:
((C ′, i, 1) , (C ′, i,m) , (C ′, i+ 1, 1)). These accesses will also be the same each time,
preventing them from leaking any information. This leaves the following as the
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portion of the access pattern that can leak information:
((B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 1) , (B, 1, 2) , (B, 1, 2) , . . . , (B, 1,m) , (B, 1,m) , (B, 2, 1) ,
(B, 2, 1) , (B, 2, 2) , (B, 2, 2) , . . . , (B, 2,m) , (B, 2,m) , . . . , (B, 4n, 1) ,
(B, 4n, 1) , (B, 4n, 2) , (B, 4n, 2) , . . . , (B, 4n,m) , (B, 4n,m))
This remaining portion of the access pattern is from the scan of B to remove the
dummy entries at the end of the oblivious sort. Again, these steps are exactly the
same each time: reading and then writing back each word in the table. Because
these steps are the same each time, they cannot leak any information as well,
leaving us with no accesses that can leak information. Therefore, this algorithm
provides oblivious rehashing of the tables.
5.2.3 Hashes are Independent
It remains to be shown that when we rehash a level, the new hash function we
select is independent of the previous hash functions. In the hierarchical model,
level i has a hash function index si associated with the level. The hash function
created by this index is defined as:
hsi(a) = RO(si · a) (mod 4i) (5.2)
where RO(·) is the oracle given to the RAM. Each time level i is rehashed, a
new value for si is chosen uniformly at random. Since si is chosen uniformly at
random each time, the hash function hsi is independent of all of the previous
hash functions selected for this level, giving us oblivious simulation by using the
hierarchical model.
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5.3 Analysis
There is one key assumption in the hierarchical solution: at no point is there a
bucket overflow in any of the hash tables. With the exception of the hash table
at level one, the only time one of the lower hash tables has data written to it is
during the rehashing of the tables. If a bucket overflows during this step, it will
happen during the pass over C ′ when the adjacent buckets are sorted. In this case,
words tagged with the same value will end up in both buckets. The algorithm, as
written, does not detect this case, however it could be easily modified to do so. At
the end of the rehashing, we scan B to remove the dummy entries. During this
scan we could check for overflows. If an overflow has occurred, we would need to
choose a new hash function and perform the rehash again or abort the simulation.
As pointed out by Kushilevitz et. al., this has the potential to leak information
[7]. Since then, a number of solutions have been proposed that reduce the risk of
a bucket overflow and improve efficiency, which we will discuss in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
VARIATIONS ON THE HIERARCHICAL SOLUTION
After the initial solutions to the oblivious RAM problem were published by Gol-
dreich and Ostrovsky [3, 8], many variations on the hierarchical solution were
proposed. The vast majority of these variations focused on making the solution
more feasible in practice. Improvements were focused along two key tracks: de-
creasing the amount of memory required compared to the original program and
making simulated accesses faster. Both of these areas could be improved by re-
moving the buckets from the hash tables, which is the main focus of the solutions
we will discuss here. The buckets were removed by adding in new features such as
Bloom filters [11] or swapping out cuckoo hash tables for the bucket hash tables
[5, 10].
6.1 Using Bloom Filters to Improve Efficiency
One of the earlier improvements to the hierarchical model was done by incorpo-
rating Bloom filters into each level [11]. Williams, Sion and Carbunar point out
that the existing oblivious RAM solutions at the time have a relatively high com-
putational overhead and can significantly slow down the execution of the program
being simulated. In response, they took the basic hierarchical solution model and
associated a Bloom filter with the hash table for each level. This allows the CPU
to securely determine, in advance, whether or not the item they are looking for is
stored at some particular level. Using the Bloom filter reduces the amortized cost
per query to O(log n log log n). Additionally, the amount of memory needed by the
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MEM portion of the RAM is reduced as well to O(n).
The primary cost reduction comes from the elimination of buckets in the hash
table and just having a flat table of 4i elements for level i. In the original hier-
archical solution, if buckets were not used in the hash table, the adversary could
potentially learn whether or not an item was found in a particular level. Here, the
CPU uses the Bloom filter to determine whether or not the item being searched
for is at the level in question, and if it is not, looks up a dummy element at that
level instead. Like the original solution, the accesses to each level will appear ran-
dom and unique between reshuﬄes, but by the elimination of buckets, reduces the
number of look ups at each level from O(log n) to O(1). The rest of the simulation
of an access remains the same. The CPU starts by scanning the entire cache (level
1 in the original hierarchical solution), then scanning a unique element at each of
the subsequent levels (either dummy elements or the real element once we find the
level that it is in). Once all of the levels have been accessed, the item is inserted
at the top level, with its value updated if a write access was being simulated.
Like the original solution, the adversary will see the same pattern of accesses
each time and will not be able to distinguish them from random accesses to each
level since each item is only accessed once between reshuﬄes of the level. The
reshuﬄe for this solution is similar in nature to the original hierarchical solution,
but differs in some key ways because of the removal of buckets and the addition
of the Bloom filter. The Bloom filter, as it is stored on the server, needs to be
constructed in an oblivious manner to prevent information leakage.1
Additionally, the two levels need to be combined in a way that does not leak
information as well. Since we have removed the buckets from this solution, it is
actually easier to combine the two levels. When level i − 1 is being reshuﬄed
into level i, the items for both levels are moved into a temporary buffer on the
server. Once there, the items are randomly permuted using the Oblivious Scramble
1For the details of how to obliviously construct a Bloom filter, see [11].
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Algorithm [11] and moved back into level i. The scramble is more efficient that the
oblivious sort of the original solution, requiring O(m log logm) time and O(
√
m)
private storage on the CPU, where m is the size of the level being reshuﬄed.
Going a step further than earlier papers, Williams, Sion and Carbunar imple-
mented their solution using Java on a computer running Redhat Fedora [11]. Their
performance analysis showed that this particular solution shows promise as a real
world application. Outside of reshuﬄes, most queries completed within a few hun-
dred milliseconds. For small, fast computations this overhead may be impractical,
but for larger data retrievals or data being sent across a network instead of a local
physical device, this slow down would not be catastrophic.
6.2 Improvements Using MapReduce and Cuckoo Hashing
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher proposed a variation on the hierarchical solution that
uses cuckoo hashing and the MapReduce paradigm [4]. A cuckoo hash table [9] is
actually two hash tables T1 and T2, each associated with their own hash function
h1 and h2. When an item x is inserted into the hash table, it is put into T1 at
location h1(x). If there is an item y already in that location, x is put in and y
is moved into T2 at location h2(y). If an item is already there, y is inserted in
that location and the item there is moved back into T1. This continues until the
final item is placed in an empty location and nothing needs to be bumped or the
insertion has run for too long and a failure is reported. The expected time to insert
a new item is constant and should succeed with high probability.
The MapReduce paradigm has become a popular method of parallel comput-
ing [5]. MapReduce provides a way to divide up data for parallel computations.
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher created a MapReduce algorithm for inserting items
into a cuckoo hash table [4]. This along with a new algorithm for sorting external
memory (a k-way modular mergesort) provided significant improvements to the
base hierarchical solution.
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In this solution, the high level hash tables retain their buckets and are used the
same as the base solution but the larger hash tables become cuckoo hash tables.
Dummy elements are used as well, like the square root solution. More formally,
the highest level hash table, Hk is used as a flat array. Hash tables Hk+1 to Hl,
for some constant l are bucket hash tables and Hl+1 to HL are cuckoo hash tables.
Each begins as an empty table with 2i dummy elements at level i, indexed by the
values −1 to −2i, and a counter di initialized to zero and incremented each access.
When an access for address a is being simulated, levelHk is scanned completely.
For levels Hk+1 to Hl, if the item has not been found bucket hi(a) is scanned;
otherwise hi(−di) is scanned. For the cuckoo hash levels Hl+1 to HL, if the item
has not been found, both tables inside the cuckoo hash table are accessed (hi1(a)
in the first and hi2(a) in the second). If the item has been found, then we access
a dummy element at hi1(di) in the first table and hi2(di) in the second. Once all
of the tables have been accessed, the (potentially updated) value is inserted in the
top level table.
Like the hierarchical solution, all of the levels are rehashed at regular intervals.
Here, each level is rehashed every 2i accesses, which is slightly more frequent that
the original solution. However, since the larger levels contain less data since they
are cuckoo hash tables instead of bucket hash tables, less data is being rehashed so
the overhead is reduced. In this solution, the amortized cost per access is O(log n)
and the storage overhead is O(n).
6.3 Switching Completely to Cuckoo Hashing
As had been pointed out in previous papers, Pinkas and Reinman begin by pointing
out that the merely theoretical solutions proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky have
such high overheads that they are more theoretical than practical constructs [10].
Instead, they set out to design a variation that was practical enough for real world
use. Like the other variations, they based theirs on the basic hierarchical solution.
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Instead of using hash tables with buckets, this solution uses cuckoo hash tables for
all of the levels. Unlike the previous solution (Section 6.2) which uses two hash
tables, each with their own hash function, for each level, this solution uses one flat
hash table indexed by both hash functions. In this construction, when item x is
inserted into the cuckoo hash table, it is inserted at location h1(x). If item y is
already at that location, it is moved to location h2(y). If an item is already at that
location, it is bounced out and put in the spot specified by h1 and so on, until the
chain has ended or it has run for too long.
In this solution, level i is a flat array of 4 · 2i entries which may contain up to
2i program addresses. Additionally, there may be up to 2i dummy elements in the
level. Every 2i−1 simulated accesses, the level is rehashed. Initially, each level is
empty and a counter that is incremented each simulated access is started at zero.
To simulate an access for program address a, the CPU begins incrementing the
counter and then scanning every item in the first level. For the remaining levels,
if the address has not been found yet, the CPU looks at entries hi1(a) and hi2(a)
for level i. If the address has already been found, then the CPU looks at two
dummy locations, hi1(dummy · count) and hi2(dummy · count), where count is our
counter. Once all of the levels have been accessed, the top level is rescanned and
the (potentially updated) value for a is written into this level.
While this solution may seem like an obvious improvement to the hierarchical
model by using smaller hash tables, Kushilevitz, Lu and Ostrovsky point out a
key flaw that allows an adversary to distinguish access patterns [7]. Because the
hash tables start empty in this solution and are not encrypted so the adversary can
see the empty elements, the adversary can distinguish access patterns with high
probability. Suppose that the CPU is searching for address a but has not found
it yet. When it gets to level i, it will look at locations hi1(a) and hi2(a). If a is
not stored at this level currently, there is a significant chance that both locations
it hashes to are empty. If the adversary sees an access to two empty locations,
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it knows the program word being searched for has not been found yet (if it was
already found, we would be looking for a dummy element that exists in at least
one of those two locations). By seeing accesses to two empty locations within a
single level, the adversary could use this information to distinguish between two
different access patterns. In practice, this may not leak enough information for the
adversary to learn something useful, but it does allow the adversary to win at the
oblivious RAM security game (Section 3.2.1).
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
There is a real need for oblivious simulation as we have seen; whether that be cloud
computing, physically secure hardware units or web based applications [2, 4, 8].
Since the original solutions were proposed by Ostrovsky and Goldreich [3, 8], later
work has primarily focused on variations of the hierarchical solution. Most of this
work has focused on decreasing the cost of oblivious simulation. In this paper, we
proposed a variation of the square root solution with a significantly lower overhead
for each simulated pass.
While it is important to lower the cost of oblivious simulation, the formalization
of the problem still leaves a lot to be desired. We have proposed several formal
security games using the definition of oblivious simulation proposed by Ostrovsky
and Goldreich [3, 8] but the definitions are not truly complete. Using their defi-
nition, we do not have a realistic way to determine if two inputs create an access
pattern with the same distribution. In the future, it will be extremely important
to flesh out the definition and the security games so that solutions can be formally
measured in terms of how well they provide oblivious simulation.
Despite the lack of a fully formalized problem, we predict that the notion of
oblivious simulation will become important over the years to come as malicious
entities try to find ways to learn information about encrypted data. Many com-
panies are beginning to use the Internet as a key piece of their software, opening
them up to any number of adversaries looking to get information about their pro-
gram. By using an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and oblivious simulation,
we have shown that one can obtain a high level of protection for software. While
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the overhead may be prohibitively high for many applications, this will be a useful
technique for sensitive applications.
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Appendix A
SOFTWARE PROTECTION
As the software market becomes more competitive, companies are becoming more
concerned with protecting their intellectual property rights. Preventing competi-
tors from learning information about your algorithms is a key piece in protecting
your software. Ostrovsky dubbed this software protection, and it was a major
component of his dissertation [8]. If an adversary is given a compiled program
and allowed to run it, the compiler is said to provide software protection if the
adversary is only able to learn the bounds for running time and memory usage as
well as which outputs correspond to which inputs. The adversary is allowed to run
the program as many times as it wants, within a reasonable time bound, and may
potentially be able to tamper with the messages sent from the CPU to the MEM.
We are going to expand our notion of the RAM definition a bit for the concept
of software protection. Recall from Section 3.1, that RAMk = (CPUk,MEMk),
for k ∈ N, is a family of types where CPUk = ITM(k,k) and MEMk = ITM(k,2kk).
An instance of RAMk is started on some input (s, y), where s is the input for CPUk
and y is the input for MEMk. For the purposes of defining software protection,
the input to MEMk is going to be the tuple (Π, x), where Π is the program the
RAMk is going to run and x is the input to the program. Our input to RAMk is
now (s, (Π, x)).
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A.1 Software Protection Security Game
Suppose we have some compiler C which takes as input an integer k and some
program Π and produces a pair (f,Πf ) where f is a randomly selected Boolean
function (f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}) and Πf is the encrypted program. Additionally,
|Πf | is of the order |Π| (|Πf | = O(|Π|)) and for some k′ = k+O(log k) there exists
an oracle RAMk′ such that for all possible programs Π, all possible functions f ,
all strings x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and all strings s ∈ {0, 1}∗, RAMk′(s, (Πf , x)) = Π(x).
We also have a specification oracle for the program Π that on an input x =
{0, 1}∗, the oracle returns (Π(x), tΠ(x), sΠ(x)), where Π(x) is the output for pro-
gram Π running on input x, tΠ(x) is the running time of the program on input x
and sΠ(x) is the amount of memory used by the program while running on input
x.
Suppose we have two adversaries, A and B. Both adversaries run in about the
same time, within some constant factor. A is given as input the compiled program
Πf and is given access to an oracle that contains RAM fk′ . A is allowed to call
the oracle as many times as it wants with different inputs (inputs would be of the
form (s, (Πf , x))). B is given as input k′ and the order of the size of Πf , namely
O(|Π|) and has access to the specification oracle for Π, specΠ. B is allowed to
query its oracle as many times as it wants as well. After both adversaries have
finished executing, they return all of the information they were able to learn about
the program as a string (outA for A and outB for B). Suppose we have a third
adversary D, which is our adversary in the software protection security game (see
Figure A.1). In World 0, D runs adversary B (see Figure A.2), and in World 1,
D runs adversary A (see Figure A.3). D must look at the information returned
by the adversary it ran and determine which world it is in. If D is able to guess
with high probability which world that it is in, then adversary A must have been
able to learn information about the program it was running in addition to running
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time/space bounds and input/output relationships. Either A must have been able
to learn information from the encrypted program Πf or from the access patterns
generated by watching the RAMk′ execute Πf .
b
D
World 0
BspecΠ(·)(k′, O(|Π|))
outB
World 1
ARAM
f
k′
(·,(·,·))(Πf )
outA
Figure A.1: The Software Protection Security Game
Experiment Expsp-0C (D):
outB ← BspecΠ(·)(k′, O(|Π|))
b
$←D(outB)
return b
Figure A.2: The Software Protection Experiment in World 0
Experiment Expsp-1C (D):
outA ← ARAM
f
k′ (·,(·,·))(Πf )
b
$←D(outA)
return b
Figure A.3: The Software Protection Experiment in World 1
The advantage of the adversary D (a measure of how well it does) is defined
as the probability that it actually guesses it is in World 1 when it is in World 1
minus the probability that it guesses it is in World 1 when it is really in World 0:
AdvspC (D) = Pr
(
Expsp-1C (D) = 1
)− Pr (Expsp-0C (D) = 1) (A.1)
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A.2 Encryption and Oblivious Simulation Give Software Protection
We will begin by reviewing the original reduction of Ostrovsky’s from software
protection to oblivious RAM simulation. This reduction uses the Boolean function
f given to the RAM by the compiler to provide encryption of the items being
stored on the MEM component. After explaining the reduction, we will redo the
formulation of the software protection game to use an IND-CPA secure encryption
scheme in place of f and redo the reduction using this new definition.
A.2.1 The Original Reduction
We will start by reviewing the reduction for an adversary who does not tamper with
the messages sent between the CPU and the MEM. Suppose we have some RAMk
which provides oblivious simulation for some universal RAMk′ . If the original
RAMk′ took time t′ to complete, RAMk runs in time t that is some polynomial
factor of t′ (t = t′ · g(t)). If such a RAMk exists, then there is a compiler C that
protects against non-tampering adversaries with an overhead bounded by O(g(t)).
Recall from our RAM model (Section 3.1) that there are three fields in the
messages sent between the CPU and the MEM: (a, i, v) where a ∈ {0, 1}k is an
address on the MEM work tape, i ∈ {read, write, halt} is an instruction and
v ∈ {0, 1}k is a value. For the compiler to provide software protection, none of
these pieces can leak information. Since we are running the compiled program
on a RAMk that provides oblivious simulation, we know by definition that the
address field cannot leak any information (otherwise the RAM would not provide
oblivious simulation). This leaves the instruction and value field. To prevent these
fields from leaking information, we modify the CPU component of our RAMk. For
the value field, we use the function f to encrypt the values being stored on the
MEM. Encryption is provided by constructing a new function f ′(·, ·) from f(·).
On inputs encount and length, f ′ returns a bit string that is length bits long and
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uses encount as its beginning input to f (Figure A.4). The CPU keeps a counter
encount which is initialized to 0 and is incremented by the length of v after each
access. When a value is being sent to the MEM, instead of sending the original
value v, it is replaced by the tuple (v⊕ f(encount), encount). Finally, to prevent
the instruction from leaking information, for each read or write instruction execute
by the CPU, the CPU will first send a read instruction and then a write instruction.
Because the value is reencrypted each write, the adversary will not be able to tell
whether or not the CPU was interested in the read or write instruction.
f ′(encount, length):
s← f(encount)
For i = 1, . . . , length− 1
s← s||f(encount + i)
Return s
Figure A.4: Definition of f ′
By preventing all of the fields from leaking information, the only information
the adversary will be able to learn is the running time of the program on each
input, the amount of memory it uses and the output corresponding to that input.
A.2.2 Reformulation of the Software Protection Game
Let us begin by redefining how our compiler C works. In this new version, the
compiler takes as input an integer k′, a program Π and an IND-CPA secure en-
cryption scheme ES = (K, E ,D) and returns the tuple (K, EK(Π)), where K is a
key generated by K and EK(Π) is the encrypted program. For k′ in the order of
k + O(log k), there exists an oblivious RAMk′ given access to K, E , D such that
for all possible programs Π, all possible keys K, and all inputs s ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
x ∈ {0, 1}∗, RAMEK(·),DK(·)k′ (s, (EK(Π), x)) = Π(x).
We will modify our original adversaries as follows. Adversary A is given access
to the encrypted program EK(Π) and an oracle that contains RAMEK(·),DK(·)k′ (a
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RAM given access to the encryption and decryption algorithms for our encryption
scheme). Adversary A can call the oracle with as many inputs as it likes (this time
the inputs would be of the form (s, (EK(Π), x))). Adversary B is given inputs k′
and |EK(Π)| and has access to the specification oracle for Π. The rest of the setup
remains the same. Both adversaries are allowed to query the oracle with inputs of
their choice and at the end of their execution must output everything they have
learned about the program. The final adversary, D, gets one of these strings and
must guess which world it is in (Figure A.5).
b
D
World 0
BspecΠ(·)(k′, |EK(Π)|)
outB
World 1
ARAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′
(·,(·,·))(EK(Π))
outA
Figure A.5: The Modified Software Protection Security Game
Our experiments in this world are slightly redefined to account for the use of
the encryption scheme (Figures A.6, A.7).
Experiment Expsp-ind-cpa-0C (D):
outB ← BspecΠ(·)(k′, |EK(Π)|)
b
$←D(outB)
return b
Figure A.6: The Software Protection Experiment with an IND-CPA Encryption
Scheme in World 0
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Experiment Expsp-ind-cpa-1C (D):
outA ← ARAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ (·,(·,·))(EK(Π))
b
$←D(outA)
return b
Figure A.7: The Software Protection Experiment with an IND-CPA Encryption
Scheme in World 1
The advantage of the adversary D is the same as our original definition:
Advsp−ind−cpaC (D) = Pr
(
Expsp-ind-cpa-1C (D) = 1
)
− Pr
(
Expsp-ind-cpa-0C (D) = 1
)
(A.2)
A.2.3 The New Reduction
Given some compiler C and an adversary D, as described in the previous section,
where the advantage of the adversary against the compiler is bound by ε:
Advsp−ind−cpaC (D) < ε (A.3)
Pr
(
Expsp-ind-cpa-1C (D) = 1
)
− Pr
(
Expsp-ind-cpa-0C (D) = 1
)
< ε (A.4)
Pr (D(outA) = 1)− Pr (D(outB) = 1) < ε (A.5)
Suppose we create a new security game (see Figure A.8) based on the original
where the adversary D is also given access to the left-right encryption oracle from
the IND-CPA security game (see Section 2.4) and the access pattern oracle from the
ORAM security game (see Section 3.2.1). Like the original games, the adversary
can query both oracles repeatedly with the inputs of its own choosing.
We can modify Equation A.3 as follows:
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b
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′
,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))
World 0
BspecΠ(·)(k′, |EK(Π)|)
outB
World 1
ARAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′
(·,(·,·))(EK(Π))
outA
Figure A.8: The Modified Software Protection Security Game
Pr (D(outA) = 1)−
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outA) = 1
)
+
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outB) = 1
)
−
Pr (D(outB) = 1) < ε
(A.6)
Let us start by considering the difference between the following probabilities:
Pr (D(outA) = 1)
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outA) = 1
)
In World 1, A is given full access to the RAMEK(·),DK(·)k′ that is running the pro-
grams. Any information that A learns by watching execution will be included in
outA. Because A already sees the access patterns, giving D the access pattern
oracle for RAMEK(·),DK(·)k′ does not allow it to learn any additional information.
Thus, if D is able to learn any additional information, it must be from queries
to the left-right encryption oracle (for example, it could learn information about
the compiled program given to adversary A). Therefore, the difference between
these two probabilities is bounded by the advantage for some IND-CPA adversary
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E against our encryption scheme ES:
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outA) = 1
)
−
Pr (D(outA) = 1) < Adv
ind-cpa
SE (E)
(A.7)
Next, consider the difference between the probabilities:
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outB) = 1
)
Pr (D(outB) = 1)
In this case, giving D access to the left-right encryption oracle does not allow
it to learn any additional information because neither adversary D or B see any
encrypted information in this game. Therefore, any additional information that D
learns must come from its access to the access pattern oracle. Thus, the difference
between these two probabilities is bounded by the advantage for some ORAM
adversary F :
Pr
(
DEK(LR(·,·,1)),AP (RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′ ,LR((·,·),(·,·),1))(outB) = 1
)
−
Pr (D(outB) = 1) < Adv
oram
RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′
(F )
(A.8)
Thus, the software protection advantage is bounded by the combination of the
advantages of the ORAM and IND-CPA schemes used:
Advsp−ind−cpaC (D) < Adv
ind-cpa
SE (E) +Adv
oram
RAM
EK (·),DK (·)
k′
(F ) (A.9)
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Appendix B
EXAMPLE SQUARE ROOT SOLUTION SIMULATION
It may be useful for the reader to see an example of a RAM being simulated by
an oblivious RAM. In this section we will describe a RAM and show a portion of
its execution. We will then describe the oblivious RAM and show how it simulates
the execution of the original RAM.
B.1 The Original RAM
Suppose we have some RAM4 in the middle of execution with the work tape of
the MEM4 component (of length 24) having the state shown in Figure B.1.
2 12 5 6 1 5 4 6 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.1: Starting State of RAM4
We are going to show eight execution steps on this RAM:
((read, 7,⊥), (write, 8, 28), (write, 2, 15), (write, 7, 14),
(read, 9,⊥), (read, 11,⊥), (write, 8, 22), (read, 4,⊥))
To begin with, the CPU4 is going to send the message (read, 7,⊥) to MEM4.
MEM4 will read the value at the seventh word on its work tape and send a message
of 4 back to CPU4. Because this is a read operation, the work tape is not updated
(see Figure B.2).
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2 12 5 6 1 5 4 6 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.2: (read, 7,⊥)
Next, the message (write, 8, 28) is sent toMEM4. The eighth word onMEM4’s
work tape is updated to 28 and the same value is returned to CPU4 (see Figure
B.3).
2 12 5 6 1 5 4 28 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.3: (write, 8, 28)
The remaining reads and writes behave the same as the previous ones (see
Figures B.4 to B.9).
2 15 5 6 1 5 4 28 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.4: (write, 2, 15)
2 15 5 6 1 5 14 28 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.5: (write, 7, 14)
2 15 5 6 1 5 14 28 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.6: (read, 9,⊥)
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2 15 5 6 1 5 14 28 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.7: (read, 11,⊥)
2 15 5 6 1 5 14 22 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.8: (write, 8, 22)
2 15 5 6 1 5 14 22 29 17 11 1 19 23 11 9
Figure B.9: (read, 4,⊥)
B.2 Oblivious Simulation of the Original RAM
Our oblivious RAM simulating the original RAM4 will be a RAM5 that contains
a MEM5 which has a work tape of length 25. However, our oblivious RAM5 will
only need to use the first 24 words on the tape since the original RAM has a work
tape of length 16 (16 + 2
√
16 = 24). We will only depict the words we are using
during simulation. Suppose that the eight steps we showed in Section B.1 begin
at the start of a new pass in the simulation and the work tape for the MEM5
has the state shown in Figure B.10 at the end of the previous pass. For the sake
of simplicity, we are again omitting that every value written to the work tape is
encrypted by the CPU before being sent to the MEM.
Before beginning our first pass, we will need to construct our function f for this
pass. In this simulation, f will map [20] to Z49. For this particular pass, suppose
that the f we construct using the random oracle gives the values as shown in Table
B.1.
Once we have generated f , we will need to update the non-shelter locations
with their new tags (Figure B.11).
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(9, 1, 2) (17, 2, 12) (14, 3, 5) (15, 4, 6) (34, 5, 1) (11, 6, 5) (27, 7, 4) (26, 8, 6)
(41, 9, 29) (18, 10, 17) (7, 11, 11) (33, 12, 1) (23, 13, 19) (39, 14, 23) (4, 15, 11) (47, 16, 9)
(46, 17, d) (30, 18, d) (25, 19, d) (48, 20, d) (11,∞, 21) (41,∞, 29) (14,∞, 3) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.10: Initial State of the Oblivious RAM5
i f(i)
1 19
2 43
3 14
4 27
5 42
6 32
7 46
8 12
9 45
10 29
11 34
12 6
13 28
14 35
15 5
16 21
17 36
18 30
19 44
20 25
Table B.1: f : [20]→ Z49 for the First Pass
Once we have updated the tags, we will need to perform a Batcher sort across
the non-shelter locations based on the value each word is tagged with. A Batcher
sort for 20 elements will generate the following comparisons: Order(1, 2),
Order(1, 2), Order(4, 5), Order(1, 3), Order(2, 4), Order(2, 3), Order(4, 5),
Order(6, 7), Order(6, 7), Order(9, 10), Order(6, 8), Order(7, 9), Order(7, 8),
Order(9, 10), Order(1, 9), Order(5, 13), Order(5, 9), Order(3, 7), Order(3, 5),
Order(7, 9), Order(2, 6), Order(4, 8), Order(4, 6), Order(8, 10), Order(2, 3),
Order(4, 5), Order(6, 7), Order(8, 9), Order(11, 12), Order(11, 12),
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(19, 1, 2) (43, 2, 12) (14, 3, 5) (27, 4, 6) (42, 5, 1) (32, 6, 5) (46, 7, 4) (12, 8, 6)
(45, 9, 29) (29, 10, 17) (34, 11, 11) (6, 12, 1) (28, 13, 19) (35, 14, 23) (5, 15, 11) (21, 16, 9)
(36, 17, d) (30, 18, d) (44, 19, d) (25, 20, d) (11,∞, 21) (41,∞, 29) (14,∞, 3) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.11: Updated Tags
Order(14, 15), Order(11, 13), Order(12, 14), Order(12, 13), Order(14, 15),
Order(16, 17), Order(16, 17), Order(19, 20), Order(16, 18), Order(17, 19),
Order(17, 18), Order(19, 20), Order(11, 19), Order(15, 23), Order(15, 19),
Order(13, 17), Order(13, 15), Order(17, 19), Order(12, 16), Order(14, 18),
Order(14, 16), Order(18, 20), Order(12, 13), Order(14, 15), Order(16, 17),
Order(18, 19), Order(1, 17), Order(9, 25), Order(9, 17), Order(5, 13),
Order(5, 9), Order(13, 17), Order(3, 19), Order(11, 27), Order(11, 19),
Order(7, 15), Order(7, 11), Order(15, 19), Order(3, 5), Order(7, 9),
Order(11, 13), Order(15, 17), Order(2, 18), Order(10, 26), Order(10, 18),
Order(6, 14), Order(6, 10), Order(14, 18), Order(4, 12), Order(8, 16),
Order(8, 12), Order(16, 20), Order(4, 6), Order(8, 10), Order(12, 14),
Order(16, 18), Order(2, 3), Order(4, 5), Order(6, 7), Order(8, 9),
Order(10, 11), Order(12, 13), Order(14, 15), Order(16, 17), Order(18, 19). For
each comparison, the two values will both be read and then written back. After
all of the order operations have been performed, the work tape will be as shown
in Figure B.12.
(5, 15, 11) (6, 12, 1) (12, 8, 6) (14, 3, 5) (19, 1, 2) (21, 16, 9) (25, 20, d) (27, 4, 6)
(28, 13, 19) (29, 10, 17) (30, 18, d) (32, 6, 5) (34, 11, 11) (35, 14, 23) (36, 17, d) (42, 5, 1)
(43, 2, 12) (44, 19, d) (45, 9, 29) (46, 7, 4) (11,∞, 21) (41,∞, 29) (14,∞, 3) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.12: Batcher Sort of Non-Shelter Locations
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count is initialized to zero and we begin the simulation of the next four accesses:
((read, 7,⊥) , (write, 8, 28) , (write, 2, 15) , (write, 7, 14))
When simulating access (read, 7,⊥), we begin by scanning the entire shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Since program address 7 was not found in the shelter, we will perform a binary
search to find it in one of the non-shelter locations using the knowledge that f(7) =
46:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 15,⊥), (read, 17,⊥), (read, 19,⊥), (read, 20,⊥))
Once we find program address 7 at physical address 20, we update the word at
address 20 to be (46,∞, 4). Then we scan the shelter, reading and writing each
value. Since program address 7 does not already exist in the shelter, we write it
to the first empty word, physical word 21 (see Figure B.13):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (46, 7, 4)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (41,∞, 29)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (14,∞, 3)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
(5, 15, 11) (6, 12, 1) (12, 8, 6) (14, 3, 5) (19, 1, 2) (21, 16, 9) (25, 20, d) (27, 4, 6)
(28, 13, 19) (29, 10, 17) (30, 18, d) (32, 6, 5) (34, 11, 11) (35, 14, 23) (36, 17, d) (42, 5, 1)
(43, 2, 12) (44, 19, d) (45, 9, 29) (46,∞, 4) (46, 7, 4) (41,∞, 29) (14,∞, 3) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.13: Simulate (read, 7,⊥)
count is incremented to 1 and we simulate the next access: (write, 8, 28). Again,
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we begin by reading the entire shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Since we did not find the word in the shelter, we perform a binary search across
the non-shelter locations using the tag f(8) = 12:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 5,⊥), (read, 3,⊥))
After locating it in physical word 3, we rewrite the value at that location:
(write, 3, (12,∞, 6))
Next, we scan the shelter again. Since the word was not found in the shelter, we
write it into the first empty location we find (see Figure B.14):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (46, 7, 4)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (12, 8, 28)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (14,∞, 3)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
(5, 15, 11) (6, 12, 1) (12,∞, 6) (14, 3, 5) (19, 1, 2) (21, 16, 9) (25, 20, d) (27, 4, 6)
(28, 13, 19) (29, 10, 17) (30, 18, d) (32, 6, 5) (34, 11, 11) (35, 14, 23) (36, 17, d) (42, 5, 1)
(43, 2, 12) (44, 19, d) (45, 9, 29) (46,∞, 4) (46, 7, 4) (12, 8, 28) (14,∞, 3) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.14: Simulate (write, 8, 28)
count is incremented to 3 and we simulate (write, 2, 15) beginning with the
scan of the shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
95
Since we did not find program address 2 in the shelter, we perform a binary search
across the non-shelter locations looking for the tag f(2) = 43:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 15,⊥), (read, 17,⊥))
Now that we have found program address 2 at physical word 17, we update the
value at that physical location:
(write, 17, (43,∞, 12))
Next we scan the shelter. Since program address 2 was in a non-shelter location,
we will put it into the first empty shelter location we find (Figure B.15):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (46, 7, 4)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (12, 8, 28)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (43, 2, 15)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
(5, 15, 11) (6, 12, 1) (12,∞, 6) (14, 3, 5) (19, 1, 2) (21, 16, 9) (25, 20, d) (27, 4, 6)
(28, 13, 19) (29, 10, 17) (30, 18, d) (32, 6, 5) (34, 11, 11) (35, 14, 23) (36, 17, d) (42, 5, 1)
(43,∞, 12) (44, 19, d) (45, 9, 29) (46,∞, 4) (46, 7, 4) (12, 8, 28) (43, 2, 15) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.15: Simulate (write, 2, 15)
We increment count to four and begin the last access we will simulate in this
pass: (write, 7, 14). Once again we start by scanning the shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
This time we find program address 7 in the shelter at physical word 21. Since we
found it in the shelter, a dummy value will be accessed. Because count is four, we
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will be looking for dummy address 20 (we have 16 program words which tells us
we should look for address 16 + 4 = 20). We will perform a binary search across
the non-shelter locations looking for the word tagged with f(20) = 25:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 5,⊥), (read, 7,⊥))
We find the dummy word at physical word 7 on the tape and write the same value
back to the tape:
(write, 7, (25, d, d))
Next we scan the shelter and update the value for program word 7 when we find
it in the shelter (Figure B.16):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (46, 7, 14)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (12, 8, 28)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (43, 2, 15)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
(5, 15, 11) (6, 12, 1) (12,∞, 6) (14, 3, 5) (19, 1, 2) (21, 16, 9) (25, 20, d) (27, 4, 6)
(28, 13, 19) (29, 10, 17) (30, 18, d) (32, 6, 5) (34, 11, 11) (35, 14, 23) (36, 17, d) (42, 5, 1)
(43,∞, 12) (44, 19, d) (45, 9, 29) (46,∞, 4) (46, 7, 14) (12, 8, 28) (43, 2, 15) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.16: Simulate (write, 7, 14)
Now that we have completed simulation of the four accesses for this pass, we
need to return all of the words to their original location on the tape. This is done by
a Batcher sort across all of the words on the work tape using the program address
of each word, which generates the following sequence of comparisons: Order(1, 2),
Order(1, 2), Order(4, 5), Order(4, 5), Order(1, 5), Order(3, 7), Order(3, 5),
Order(2, 4), Order(2, 3), Order(4, 5), Order(7, 8), Order(7, 8), Order(10, 11),
Order(10, 11), Order(7, 11), Order(9, 13), Order(9, 11), Order(8, 10),
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Order(8, 9), Order(10, 11), Order(1, 9), Order(5, 13), Order(5, 9),
Order(3, 11), Order(7, 15), Order(7, 11), Order(3, 5), Order(7, 9),
Order(2, 10), Order(6, 14), Order(6, 10), Order(4, 8), Order(4, 6),
Order(8, 10), Order(2, 3), Order(4, 5), Order(6, 7), Order(8, 9), Order(10, 11),
Order(13, 14), Order(13, 14), Order(16, 17), Order(16, 17), Order(13, 17),
Order(15, 19), Order(15, 17), Order(14, 16), Order(14, 15), Order(16, 17),
Order(19, 20), Order(19, 20), Order(22, 23), Order(22, 23), Order(19, 23),
Order(21, 25), Order(21, 23), Order(20, 22), Order(20, 21), Order(22, 23),
Order(13, 21), Order(17, 25), Order(17, 21), Order(15, 23), Order(19, 27),
Order(19, 23), Order(15, 17), Order(19, 21), Order(14, 22), Order(18, 26),
Order(18, 22), Order(16, 20), Order(16, 18), Order(20, 22), Order(14, 15),
Order(16, 17), Order(18, 19), Order(20, 21), Order(22, 23), Order(1, 17),
Order(9, 25), Order(9, 17), Order(5, 21), Order(13, 29), Order(13, 21),
Order(5, 9), Order(13, 17), Order(3, 19), Order(11, 27), Order(11, 19),
Order(7, 23), Order(15, 31), Order(15, 23), Order(7, 11), Order(15, 19),
Order(3, 5), Order(7, 9), Order(11, 13), Order(15, 17), Order(19, 21),
Order(2, 18), Order(10, 26), Order(10, 18), Order(6, 22), Order(14, 30),
Order(14, 22), Order(6, 10), Order(14, 18), Order(4, 20), Order(12, 28),
Order(12, 20), Order(8, 16), Order(8, 12), Order(16, 20), Order(4, 6),
Order(8, 10), Order(12, 14), Order(16, 18), Order(20, 22), Order(2, 3),
Order(4, 5), Order(6, 7), Order(8, 9), Order(10, 11), Order(12, 13),
Order(14, 15), Order(16, 17), Order(18, 19), Order(20, 21), Order(22, 23).
Each comparison generates a read of each of the two locations and then a write to
both locations. After the Batcher sort, the work tape will be as depicted in Figure
B.17.
Now we are ready to begin the second pass and simulate the next four accesses:
((read, 9,⊥), (read, 11,⊥), (write, 8, 22), (read, 4,⊥))
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(19, 1, 2) (43, 2, 15) (14, 3, 5) (27, 4, 6) (42, 5, 1) (32, 6, 5) (46, 7, 14) (12, 8, 28)
(45, 9, 29) (29, 10, 17) (34, 11, 11) (6, 12, 1) (28, 13, 19) (35, 14, 23) (5, 15, 11) (21, 16, 9)
(36, 17, d) (30, 18, d) (44, 19, d) (25, 20, d) (12,∞, 6) (43,∞, 12) (46,∞, 4) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.17: Batcher Sort Across All Words
To begin with, we need to construct a new f : [20]→ Z49 using the random oracle.
Suppose the f we construct for this pass maps the values as shown in Table B.2.
i f(i)
1 39
2 26
3 36
4 30
5 16
6 6
7 48
8 10
9 34
10 7
11 9
12 43
13 33
14 28
15 25
16 45
17 35
18 1
19 19
20 15
Table B.2: f : [20]→ Z49 for the Second Pass
Once again we begin by updating the tags on all of the non-shelter locations,
as seen in Figure B.18.
Next we perform a Batcher sort across the non-shelter locations, sorting by
tags. As we already know, the Batcher sort is deterministic (Section 2.5) so the
comparisons will be the same as in the first pass. After the Batcher sort, the work
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(39, 1, 2) (26, 2, 15) (36, 3, 5) (30, 4, 6) (16, 5, 1) (6, 6, 5) (48, 7, 14) (10, 8, 28)
(34, 9, 29) (7, 10, 17) (9, 11, 11) (43, 12, 1) (33, 13, 19) (28, 14, 23) (25, 15, 11) (45, 16, 9)
(35, 17, d) (1, 18, d) (19, 19, d) (15, 20, d) (12,∞, 6) (43,∞, 12) (46,∞, 4) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.18: Update the Tags on all Non-Shelter Locations
tape will be as shown in Figure B.19.
(1, 18, d) (6, 6, 5) (7, 10, 17) (9, 11, 11) (10, 8, 28) (15, 20, d) (16, 5, 1) (19, 19, d)
(25, 15, 11) (26, 2, 15) (28, 14, 23) (30, 4, 6) (33, 13, 19) (34, 9, 29) (35, 17, d) (36, 3, 5)
(39, 1, 2) (43, 12, 1) (45, 16, 9) (48, 7, 14) (12,∞, 6) (43,∞, 12) (46,∞, 4) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.19: Batcher Sort by Tag Across Non-Shelter Locations
We initialize count to 1 and begin to simulate (read, 9,⊥) by scanning the
entire shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Since nothing has been put in the shelter yet for this pass, we do not find program
word 9 in the shelter, so we begin a binary search for it outside of the shelter
looking for tag f(9) = 34:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 15,⊥), (read, 12,⊥), (read, 13,⊥), (read, 14,⊥))
Finding the word at physical address 14, we update the value at that location to
be (34,∞, 29) and rescan the shelter, putting program word 9 into the first empty
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shelter location (Figure B.20):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (34, 9, 29)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (43,∞, 12)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (46,∞, 4)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
(1, 18, d) (6, 6, 5) (7, 10, 17) (9, 11, 11) (10, 8, 28) (15, 20, d) (16, 5, 1) (19, 19, d)
(25, 15, 11) (26, 2, 15) (28, 14, 23) (30, 4, 6) (33, 13, 19) (34,∞, 29) (35, 17, d) (36, 3, 5)
(39, 1, 2) (43, 12, 1) (45, 16, 9) (48, 7, 14) (34, 9, 29) (43,∞, 12) (46,∞, 4) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.20: Simulate (read, 9,⊥)
We increment count to two and simulate our next access, (read, 11,⊥), by
scanning the shelter again:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Not finding the word in the shelter, we perform a binary search across the non-
shelter locations using the tag f(11) = 9:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 5,⊥), (read, 3,⊥), (read, 4,⊥))
We update the value at physical word 4 (where we found program word 11) to
be (9,∞, 11). Next we rescan the shelter and insert the word into the first empty
location (Figure B.21):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (34, 9, 29)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (9, 11, 11)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (46,∞, 4)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
count is increased to three. The third access we are simulating on this pass is
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(1, 18, d) (6, 6, 5) (7, 10, 17) (9,∞, 11) (10, 8, 28) (15, 20, d) (16, 5, 1) (19, 19, d)
(25, 15, 11) (26, 2, 15) (28, 14, 23) (30, 4, 6) (33, 13, 19) (34,∞, 29) (35, 17, d) (36, 3, 5)
(39, 1, 2) (43, 12, 1) (45, 16, 9) (48, 7, 14) (34, 9, 29) (9, 11, 11) (46,∞, 4) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.21: Simulate (read, 11,⊥)
(write, 8, 22). As usual, we start by scanning the shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Again, we do not find the word in the shelter so we perform a binary search across
the rest of the work tape, looking for the tag f(8) = 10:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 5,⊥))
When we find the word at physical address 5, we update the value there to be
(10,∞, 28). Next, we rescan and update the shelter, putting program address 8
into the first empty shelter location we find (Figure B.22):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (34, 9, 29)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (9, 11, 11)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (10, 8, 22)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (23,∞, 19)))
count is incremented to four and we simulate the last access for this pass:
(read, 4,⊥). We begin by scanning the entire shelter:
((read, 21,⊥), (read, 22,⊥), (read, 23,⊥), (read, 24,⊥))
Program word 4 is not found in the shelter so we perform a binary search across
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(1, 18, d) (6, 6, 5) (7, 10, 17) (9,∞, 11) (10,∞, 28) (15, 20, d) (16, 5, 1) (19, 19, d)
(25, 15, 11) (26, 2, 15) (28, 14, 23) (30, 4, 6) (33, 13, 19) (34,∞, 29) (35, 17, d) (36, 3, 5)
(39, 1, 2) (43, 12, 1) (45, 16, 9) (48, 7, 14) (34, 9, 29) (9, 11, 11) (10, 8, 22) (23,∞, 19)
Figure B.22: Simulate (write, 8, 22)
the non-shelter locations looking for tag f(4) = 30:
((read, 10,⊥), (read, 15,⊥), (read, 12,⊥))
The word at physical address 12 is updated to be (30,∞, 6) and we scan the shelter,
putting the program word into the last empty shelter location (Figure B.23):
((read, 21,⊥), (write, 21, (34, 9, 29)) , (read, 22,⊥), (write, 22, (9, 11, 11)) ,
(read, 23,⊥), (write, 23, (10, 8, 22)) , (read, 24,⊥), (write, 24, (30, 4, 6)))
(1, 18, d) (6, 6, 5) (7, 10, 17) (9,∞, 11) (10,∞, 28) (15, 20, d) (16, 5, 1) (19, 19, d)
(25, 15, 11) (26, 2, 15) (28, 14, 23) (30,∞, 6) (33, 13, 19) (34,∞, 29) (35, 17, d) (36, 3, 5)
(39, 1, 2) (43, 12, 1) (45, 16, 9) (48, 7, 14) (34, 9, 29) (9, 11, 11) (10, 8, 22) (30, 4, 6)
Figure B.23: Simulate (read, 4,⊥)
Now that we have finished simulating the next four accesses, we need to perform
a Batcher sort across the entire work tape by program address to return all of the
values to their original location. The comparisons that are made in this pass are
the same as in the previous pass for this particular step. After the sort is complete,
the work tape will be as in Figure B.24.
This completes the second pass of our simulation and all of the accesses we are
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(39, 1, 2) (26, 2, 15) (36, 3, 5) (30, 4, 6) (16, 5, 1) (6, 6, 5) (48, 7, 14) (10, 8, 22)
(34, 9, 29) (7, 10, 17) (9, 11, 11) (43, 12, 1) (33, 13, 19) (28, 14, 23) (25, 15, 11) (45, 16, 9)
(35, 17, d) (1, 18, d) (19, 19, d) (15, 20, d) (9,∞, 11) (10,∞, 28) (30,∞, 6) (34,∞, 29)
Figure B.24: Batcher Sort by Address Across All Words
simulating in this demonstration. If the original RAM continued execution, the
remaining passes would continue from this point.
